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ABSTRACT
It is a common refrain that value is increasingly assessed in monetary terms. Public services are
privatized. We live in a 'neoliberal' era, one in which market understandings of value seem to be
the only understanding of value. What, then, are we to make of actions and policies that seem to
go in the opposite direction, which decommodify and nationalize, which transfer persons and
objects from the private to the public domain? Are they just strange outliers? Do they paradoxically
support a neoliberal conception of value by providing an affirming counterpoint? And just how
are such transformations effected as a matter of law? This Article documents one such case-the
taking by eminent domain for use as a national memorial the private property in rural
Pennsylvania where one of the planes hijacked on September 11, 2001 crashed. What had been
private property was revealed to be national tertoiy. While the site's transformation to 'sacred
ground' was seemingly uncontested as a matter of national politics, as a matter of law it was not
so simple. I trace in detail how different constituencies-family members of those killed, the
landowner's 'stigma' appraiser, the memorial designers and architects, lawyers, the court-
struggled over whether the landowner should be compensated for the enhancement in value due to
the plane crash, since the site was now a tourist destination. In the recently concluded court case,
the landowner was indeed paid for the land's enhanced 'sacred' and heritage value. We see, as it
were, the birth pangs of decommodification in a neoliberal order: the simultaneous recognition of
the public's interest and the assessment of that interest in terms of monetary value and the payment
of that value to the owner.
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INTRODUCTION
In his deposition, Randall Bell, a real estate appraiser with an ex-
pertise in stigmatized property, explained that the land where United
Airlines Flight 93 crashed during the attacks of September 11, 2001
had increased in value because of the attacks:
[T]here's an intangible asset attached to this property in perpetuity
that's going to generate income, so it's unlike another business such as a
McDonald's where you can take those intangibles and move them to an-
other building across town. You can't do that here.
Bell, also known as the "Master of Disaster,"2 is usually concerned
with the kind of stigma that diminishes value, as with a violent death
or a haunted house. He has appraised properties uch as the man-
1 Svonavec, Inc.'s Supplemental Filing I, Exhibit I, Bell Dep. 77:18-22, Dec. 20, 2011, Unit-
ed States v. 275.81 Acres of Land, No. 3:09-cv-00233, 2014 BL 387242 (W.D. Pa. June 10,
2014), Doc. No. 114-8 [hereinafter "Bell Deposition"].
2 See Quick Overview: Real Estate Damage Economics, http://www.masterofdisaster.com
(redirecting browsers to the Overview section of Real Estate Damage Economics, LLC's
website).
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sion where Heaven's Gate members committed suicide and the house
where JonBenet Ramsey was strangled.
But the stigma at issue in the 9/11 crash did not diminish the
site's value-quite the contrary, according to Bell. What Bell de-
scribed as a "permanently attached intangible"4 asset increased that
site's monetary value by almost forty times, from about $600,000 to
over $23 million.5 In the context of an eminent domain proceeding
to determine what would constitute just compensation under the
Fifth Amendment, Bell urged that this higher amount should be
paid to his business partner who owned the crash site.
This Article tells the story of the former strip mine where Flight 93
crashed, its transformation into what many people called "sacred
ground,"' and the recently concluded court proceeding, United States
of America v. 275.81 Acres of Land, More or Less, which determined that
the landowner would indeed be compensated for the enhancement
in value occasioned by the 9/11 attacks. Although there is an enor-
mous literature on 9/11 and the memorialization of the attacks," this
is the first piece of legal scholarship on the Flight 93 proceeding.
Rather than a routine takings proceeding, this case speaks to time-
ly issues of how collisions between market and non-market ideas of
value are managed by our legal system.o In an era where value seems
to be increasingly assessed in monetary terms, what many deem a
"neoliberal" era," how did this supposed sacred value intersect with
3 RUSSELL HOLLINGSWORTH & DAVID E. WRIGHT, CONVERSATIONS ON SUCCESS, 183.
4 Bell Deposition, supra note 1, at 78:1.
5 Id. The value of the land simply as "open space," that is, its value absent any enhance-
ment from the 9/11 attacks, was about $610,000. Report of the Commission at 46, Dec.
9, 2013 United States of America v. 275.81 Acres of Land, at *3, 2014 WL 1248205 (W.D.
Pa., 2014) [hereinafter "December 2013 Commission Report"].
6 The Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that "private property [shall not] be
taken for public use, withoutjust compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
7 See infra Parts I.B and IC, and accompanying text (defining and elaborating on the con-
cept of "sacred ground[s]").
8 United States v. 275.81 Acres of Land, 2014 WL 1248205, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 2014).
9 See infra Part U.A (discussing just compensation as equity).
10 PAUL KAHN, PUTTING LIBERALISM IN ITS PLACE 1-3 (2005); MICHAEL SANDEL, WHAT MONEY
CAN'T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS (2012).
11 WENDY BROWN, UNDOING THE DEMOS: NEOLIBERALISM'S STEALTH REVOLUTION 10
(2015); David Singh Grewal and Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 77
J.L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 4 (2014). The term "neoliberal" has been used in a variety of
senses but often refers to a way of imagining social order and proper public policy as
grounded in market conceptions of value. It is generally associated with the "free mar-
ket" policies of President Ronald Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher,
but has been used to capture a broader array of phenomena than just those policies. It is
distinct to classical liberalism, some such as Brown contend, in that it is a form of imagi-
nation which actually overcomes the state/market divide and the public/private divide,
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monetary value? By public demand and Congressional action, the
land was decommodified, that is, it was taken out of its everyday status
as private property and exchangeable resource, and designated a
place of national mourning.2 But the transformation was not simple,
and this Article traces in detail how different constituencies-family
members of those killed, real estate appraisers, lawyers, the court-
understood and struggled over the change. It documents, as it were,
the birth pangs of decommodification. Focusing on the tension be-
tween market value, heritage, and the sacred, it asks in what ways, and
through what frameworks and categories, this transformation has
been understood and contested.
The Article fills a gap in the existing legal scholarship by address-
ing whether just compensation includes the enhancement in value
due to a national tragedy, a context where it may seem inequitable to
financially profit from the deaths of fellow citizens.'1 While legal
scholars have spent a good deal of energy, post-Kelo v. City of New
London, discussing what counts as a public use under the Fifth
Amendment, much less attention has been paid to what constitutes
which remained central to classical liberalism. Rather, for neoliberalism, the state be-
comes an instrument of the market, which in turn is seen as the creation of the state's
complicated regulatory apparatus. Thus, neoliberalism overcomes the naive conception
of markets inherent in laissez-faire market liberalism. The problem with, or question for,
this form of imagination, when put into lived practice, is that this conception of every-
thing as marketized undermines basic conditions of sociability and mutual aid. This essay
explores two central categories of sociability and mutual aid: the notions of sacrifice and
the sacred; and notions of value that are seen to transcend or ground market value.
Through this exploration, the implicit claim put forth is that our social order cannot be
seen as truly "neoliberal," as non-monetary conceptions of value are still patently quite
important. But this case-study is a bit more nuanced, since it is an examination of just
how-through law, doctrine and practice-we move between the sacred and monetary
conceptions of value.
12 See infra Part I.A (elaborating on the discussion of moving"from the sacred to heritage").
13 See infra Part I.A; see also Mary L. Clark, Reconstructing the World Trade Center: An Argument
for the Application of Personhood Theory to Commercial Property Ownership and Use, 109 PENN ST.
L. REv. 815 (2005) (applying personhood theory to understand what various parties have
lost in the 9/11 attacks, but not what they have "gained" as a result of the attacks and
whether the government must compensate them for taking that gain); Mary L. Clark,
Treading on Hallowed Ground: Implications for Property Law and Critical Theory of Land Associ-
ated with Human Death and Buria4 94 KY. L.J. 487 (2005-06) (employing Margaret Radin's
work on personhood and property to discuss decommodification of WTC site footprints).
The legal scholarship on windfalls also does not adequately address the particular issues
at stake in the context of a national tragedy, I argue, infra. See generally Eric Kades, Wind-
falls, 108 YALE L.J. 1489, 1491 (1999); Gregory R. Kirsch, Hurricanes and Windfalls: Takings
and Price Controls in Emergencies, 79 VA. L. REV. 1235, 1238 (1993); Comment, just Compen-
sation and the Assassins' Bequest: A Utilitarian Approach, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1012, 1024
(1974).
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just compensation.4  The dominant market value understanding of
just compensation should be seen as derivative, this Article argues, of
the goal of providing just-that is, equitable-compensation. Indeed,
the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that just compensation is
grounded in equity.'5 In the context of the Flight 93 case, equity does
not, it is urged, require that the landowner be compensated for the
market enhancement attributable to the attacks. In World War II,
the Court excluded the enhanced value due to total war from its def-
inition ofjust compensation, describing the rise in wartime prices as a
consequence of the government project of war-making; and equity
did not require the government to pay for the increase it had itself
created.6  The Flight 93 case presents the updated scenario for the
war on terror, a conflict in which sporadic attacks punotured everyday
life and created sites of mourning, and which, incidentally, changed
the economic value of some of those attacked sites. In its simplest
form, the claim is that the enhancement in value was intrinsically
public, and thus not the property of the owner. Just compensation
seeks to make the condemnee whole, to return to them what is taken
from them," and the owner, it is argued, did not own Bell's intangible
14 See infra Part II; Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472 (2005). To the extent that
market value has been interrogated, it is for undercompensating the landowner (by not
including compensatory damages, relocation costs, and the subjective value of the prop-
erty, leading some to advocate above-market compensation). SeeJames W. Ely, Jr., The
Histoncal Context of Just Compensation, 30:3 PRACHiCAL REAL ESTATE LAWYER 9 (2014)
(summarizing complaints regarding market value measure of value). Such discussions
have not engaged the question of how to determine just compensation where there is an
enhancement of value due to an act of violence against the nation where market value
may be too high. More broadly, however, my argument regarding just compensation as
equity dovetails with these efforts to displace market value as the only way to understand
just compensation. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Do-
main, 105 MICH. L. REV. 101, 111 (2006) (noting that takings "literature concentrates on
discerning when a taking has occurred, rather than how much is owed once it has" and
arguing that perception that landowners are undercompensated is not accurate because
government has political incentives to avoid property with a high subjective value) ; see al-
so Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessinglust Compensation for Regulatoy Tak-
ings, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 677, 682 (2005) ("Surprisingly, this familiar disagreement ignores
what should be a central issue in takings analysis: when compensation is due, how much
should the government have to pay?"). Serkin describes the flexibility that in practice
underlies the apparently monolithic measure of market value. Id.; See also Katrina Miri-
am Wyman, The Measure ofJust Compensation, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 239, 241 (2007) (not-
ing renewed interest in alternatives to market value after Kelo).
15 See infra Part II.A.
16 See infra notes 177-80 and accompanying text.
17 United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 281 (1943) ("It is a well
settled rule that while it is the owner's loss, not the taker's gain, which is the measure of
compensation for the property taken, not all losses suffered by the owner are compensa-
ble under the Fifth Amendment.").
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value. Thus, the recent award, which included the value of the land
as a private 9/11 memorial, and simply used market value as its
measure of just compensation, was mistaken."
Part I describes the change from unremarkable land to a place of
national prominence as hundreds of thousands of people visited the
site and created an impromptu memorial.8 The category of heritage
provided the legal and policy structure through which the transfor-
mation was given recognition and institutional form-the land was
declared a national historic site and a national park to be managed by
the National Park Service. A key element of this transformation was
to be the national memorial; controversies over the design of this
memorial provide insight into how the transformation was envi-
sioned. The winning entry in the design competition for the memo-
rial was centered around the "sacred ground" of the crash site. But
this design encountered strident opposition: it was accused of includ-
ing sacred Islamic symbolism because it included two semi-circles,
which the designer had slated to be planted with trees with red
leaves-that is, two "red crescents."'o In this controversy, we see the
deployment of two notions of the "sacred"-one supposedly unifying,
nonsectarian or even post-religious, and evoking national tragedy, the
other a controversial and, in the eyes of protestors, insulting intru-
sion of an alien religion.
Part II turns to the Article's central concern: the taking of the
crash site through eminent domain and the recently concluded effort
in United States v. 275.81 Acres of Land to determine the amount of
compensation due the owner, Svonavec, Inc. ("Svonavec"), a family-
owned quarry company.21 Even though the crash site was destined to
be a national memorial, this side of the process-the land acquisi-
tion-ran into trouble. The owner wished to receive the increase in
value to the land due to the crash, while the government was unwill-
ing to pay that surplus. Lurking underneath the inability to come to
terms were questions as to whether the value of a place of national
meaning can be assessed in money, and whether the landowner
should own or receive the enhancement in value occasioned by the
9/11 attacks. This Part begins by describing the legal framework of
takings law and determines, at least at first glance, that the landowner
was due any increase in value to the land due to the attacks since the
18 See infra notes 174-206 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 29-79 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 69-79 and accompanying text.
21 United States v. 275.81 Acres of Land, No. 09-233, 2014 WL 1248205 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 26,
2014).
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typical formula looks to market value at the time of taking." Then,
through an analysis of the competing real estate appraisals submitted
in the condemnation proceeding in the federal court, it describes the
dual transformation of the land into a form of value beyond the mar-
ket and, simultaneously, its apparent increase in market value. The
government disputed whether such an increase existed at ll on what
it called "vacant" land.2 - And yet, because it adhered to the usual
formulation of just compensation as market value at the time of tak-
ing, the government did not contest that an increase, if it could be
demonstrated, should accrue to the landowner. Finally, this Part de-
scribes the outcome of the condemnation proceeding. A court-
appointed Commission of local real estate experts compensated the
owner for the 9/11 related enhancement in value, but found that it
was not as valuable as the owner and the stigma appraiser had sug-
gested. The Commission awarded $1.5 million on the basis of the
market value of a private memorial at the time of taking, more than
double its non-9/11 value, but far less than the $23 million Bell had
d24urged .
Part III revisits the legal doctrine of just compensation to argue
that despite first appearances, the landowner should not have re-
ceived any increase in the land's value due to the attacks. As the Su-
preme Court has stated many times, it is just compensation that must
be provided, and courts may consider the equitable factors at issue.25
Unlike other windfalls where we assume the landowner would retain
the benefit, this windfall derived from illegal conduct and an act of
war; thus there are equitable reasons why the owner should not re-
ceive compensation for the sacred value.
Part IV attempts to understand what many of the participants in
this story are talking about when they call the site "sacred," and, more
ambitiously, asks whether the term is of any legal utility in under-
standing the dispute over value. One archaic sense of the sacred is
that it is the property of the gods. While we cannot, of course, apply
that notion directly to the controversy here, it suggests a way of un-
22 See infra notes 87-96 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 142-57 and accompanying text.
24 December 2013 Commission Report, supra note 5, at 49-52, 71.
25 See infra notes 176-84 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 185-203 and accompanying text.
27 TALAi ASAD, FORMATIONS OF THE SECULAR: CHRISTIANITY, ISLAM, MODERNITY 30 (2003)
(citing W.W. Fowler, The Original Meaning of the Word Sacer, in ROMAN ESSAYS AND
INTERPRETATIONS 15 (1920)). Asad writes of the sacer in the Roman Republic as "any-
thing that was owned by a deity, having been 'taken out of the region of the profanum by
the action of the State, and passed on into that of the sacrum.'"
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derstanding what people are talking about when they talk about the
sacred: the added value is bound up in real property, but it does not
belong to any private party as property itself. Bell is correct to see an
intangible asset-but wrong to think the landowner should be paid
for it. Patrick White, a real estate lawyer and a member of the group
representing the family members of those who died on Flight 93, put
it this way:
Everybody's private property has a value. I understand that .... I repre-
sent clients in that fashion, but that property to me is priceless to [sic]
the reason that it has blood, bones and the souls [sic] of my
cousin ... and that of 39 other people, and in a sense a tremendous
28price has been already paid for that land.
I. PRIVATE PROPERTY TO NATIONAL MEMORIAL
On September 11, 2001, the forty passengers and crew on board
United Airlines Flight 93, having learned of the attacks on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon, collectively decided to regain con-
trol of the plane.2 9 They are credited with preventing the hijackers
from reaching their target in Washington, DC. The plane crashed at
about 500 miles per hour, leaving a deep gash in the ground. As one
witness said, it seemed as though the land had "swallowed" up the
plane and passengers.3o The victims had become embedded in soil
and debris and were, except for tiny fragments, unrecoverable.3 ' The
land itself became a site of potent meaning for family members, who
felt a connection to it. One FBI employee recounted in a memoir
seeing angels guarding the site.33 Many of the family members, law
28 Jennifer Reeger, Donation Box at Heart of Flight 93 Memorial Tiff in Somerset Co., TRIBLIVE,
June 6, 2007, http://triblive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/regional/s_511233.html.
29 See NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT 13-14 (2004).
30 LILLIE LEONARDI, IN THE SHADOW OF A BADGE: A SPIRITUAL MEMOIR 35 (2011).
31 See, Katherine Q. Seelye, At a 9/11 Site, a 'Last Funeral, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/10/us/l0shanksville.html (quoting Somerset County
coroner, Wallace Miller, as stating that only 8 percent of human remains were recovera-
ble and that "[e]verything vaporized on impact"); Dave Barry, On Hallowed Ground,
MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 7, 2002, http://www.miamiherald.com/living/liv-columns-
blogs/dave-barry/articlel938637.html ("No bodies were recovered here, at least not as we
normally think of bodies. In the cataclysmic violence of the crash, the people on Flight
93 literally disintegrated. Searchers found fragments of bones, small pieces of flesh, a
hand. But no bodies.").
32 See, e.g., Reeger, supra note 28 ("[B]ut that property to me is priceless to [sic] the reason
that it has blood, bones and the souls of my cousin . . . .").
33 LEONARDI, supra note 30, at 37; see alsoJoe Mandak, Lillie Leonardi, Ex-FB1, Claims She Saw
Angels Guarding Flight 93 Site, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 3, 2012,
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enforcement officers, and politicians, described the land as "sacred."34
What did they mean, and were there any legal consequences to this
assertion?
Along with the other 9/11 sites, the field became an improvised
shrine. Tens of thousands of objects were left by visitors: flags, key
chains, crucifixes, flowers, photographs, teddy bears, and baseball
caps." Within months, the crater was filled and the area planted with
grass. Within a year, plans for a more permanent memorial were un-
derway. There were about 150,000 visitors per year in the decade fol-
lowing the attacks, a number that was expected to double in 2012.
Pamela Tokar-Ickes, a local official, described to Congress the sense
that this "history belongs to all of us" and that "Our Buckstown" had
become an important place., " [W]hether by fate or destiny," she tes-
tified, "Somerset County, Pennsylvania holds a unique place in Amer-
ican history. . . ." Not only had an out-of-the-way part of Pennsylva-
nia become important nationally, the local people had "become the
39caretakers"of this new resource.
A. From The Sacred To Heritage
Even though many people described the land as "sacred," there
was anxiety about what this entailed and whether the local "caretak-
ers" were able to preserve the site. This special place, family mem-
bers and others contended, needed federal protection, support, and
legal recognition.0 One year after 9/11, Congress passed The Flight
93 National Memorial Act, authorizing the creation of a memorial as
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/03/exfbi-employee-claims-she-saw-angels-
flight-93_n_1646539.html.
34 See infra notes 28, 30-32 and accompanying text.
35 See RICHARD SNODGRASS, AN UNCOMMON FIELD (2011) (depicting photos Snodgrass took
of the crash site of Flight 93); Richard Snodgrass, An Uncommon Field, RICHARD
SNODGRASS, http://www.rsnodgrass.com/portfolios/anuncommonfield.html (same); see
also Vicki Rock, Flight93 7ributes Moved to Storage, DAILY AMERICAN, July 23, 2008,
http://articles.dailyamerican.com/2008-07-23/news/26313506_1_public-memorial-
temporary-memorial-permanent-memorial (noting that "[a]bout 30,000 items ha[d] been
left at the site").
36 See Paul Peirce, Flight 93 Memorial Visits Exceed Expectation, TRIBLIVE NEWS, July 28, 2012,
http://triblive.com/news/allegheny/2263521-74/park-memorial-flight-national-felt-
reinbold-million-sept-service-passengers.
37 Hearing on H.R. 2099, H.R. 3917 and H.R. 4874 Before the Subcomm. on National Parks, Recre-
ation, and Public Lands of the H. Comm. on Resources, 107th Cong. 33 (2002) (statement of
Pamela Tokar-Ickes, Somerset County Commissioner).
38 Id. at 34.
39 Id. at 33.
410 See infra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
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a "unit" of the National Park Service, a part of the Department of the
Interior.4 ' As the law noted, "Many are profoundly concerned about
the future disposition of the crash site . .. .. ,42 The concerns about
the future of the site were described in the Congressional hearings.
Elizabeth Kemmerer, a family member of one of the passengers, told
the House Subcommittee on National Parks that the "site, without
proper care ... and maintenance, has the potential of becoming a
circus atmosphere where trinkets and trash will be sold."43 A National
Park Service representative, P. Daniel Smith, explained that the local
governments were unable to "protect the site from inappropriate rel-
ic seekers."" And "[e]stablishing a permanent memorial
would ... provide an appropriately respectful setting for family
members and other visitors."0
Kemmerer brought along to the hearings photographs of the
temporary memorial that visitors had created-an eclectic combina-
tion of flags, mementos, and photos.4 6 Such popular, unregulated ac-
tivity was unpredictable, and institutional and governmental support
was needed, Kemmerer noted, but the local governments were not up
to the task.47 They were "not equipped to take on the burden, both
financial and logistical, of maintaining a site where Americans can go
to remember the heroics of [the] 40 passengers and crew. The crash
site should be a place to say a prayer, meditate or reflect on just what
happened... "4 Smith, of the Park Service, noted that, in
addition, there is a crucial need for National Park Service technical assis-
tance to be available to consult on the immediate needs of collections,
storage, oral history, and archives. We learned from our role at the Vi-
etnam Veterans Memorial there is a great need to permit the public to
49
place mementos and express feelings.
41 See Flight 93 National Memorial Act, Pub. L. No. 107-226, § 2(a)(5), 116 Stat. 1345, 1345
(2002).
42 Id. at§ 2(a) (3).
43 Hearing on H.R 2099, H.R. 3917 and H.R 4874 Before the Subcomm. on National Parks, Recre-
ation, and Public Lands of the H. Comm. on Resources, 107th Cong. 38 (2002) (statement of
Elizabeth Kemmerer, Flight 93 Family Organization Representative).
44 Id. at 11 (statement of P. Daniel Smith, Special Assistant to the Director, National Park
Service, U.S. Department of the Interior).
45 Id. at 15.
46 Kemmerer, supra note 43, at 39. See generally, Snodgrass, supra note 35 (presenting a col-
lection of photos of mementos from the site).
47 Id. at 38-39.
48 Id. at 38.
49 Hearing on H.R. 2099, HR. 3917 and H.R. 4874 Before the Subcomm. on National Parks, Recre-
alion, and Public Lands of the H. Comm. on Resources, 107th Cong. 19-20 (2002) (statement
of P. Daniel Smith, Special Assistant to the Director, National Park Service, U.S. Depart-
ment of the Interior).
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In sum, a fear of unregulated commercialism and the circus, along
with a need to curate and document the popular memorials, required
federal involvement.
Congress did not have an established category of "sacred" ground
within which to locate the parcel. The term only appears in the
Flight 93 case as a legal category in relation to whether there were
Indian sacred sites on the land, a matter which the Environmental
Impact Statement disposed of handily: "Sacred sites (as defined in
[Executive Order] 13007) [.] No; none exist."5 0  Instead, Congress
turned to the National Park Service, and the vocabulary of memori-
als, nature, parks, and heritage. As Peter Byrne has described, the
Park Service had moved into historic preservation in the 1920s, and it
had taken responsibility for other sites of national mourning, such as
Gettysburg Battlefield and Arlington National Cemetery." Within
this structure, the decision to see Flight 93 through the lens of parks
and heritage is understandable. And yet the absence of an explicitly
nationalistic or religious framework is noteworthy and led to some
points of tension with family members. In response to a complaint
that a "park" sounded like a place for picnic, not a place to mourn,
an apologetic Park official explained:
It's really hard for us sometimes to not say 'the park' because of our NPS
habits and culture. We really do know it's a national memorial. What we
try to do is say 'the unit of the National Park Service.' Does that make
sense and is that more palatable?52
The designation of the site as a unit of the Park Service was proce-
durally unusual, bypassing the normal bureaucratic processes of ex-
tensive study into whether a site would be an appropriate park and
whether it was of genuine historic significance." Both of these crite-
50 National Park Service, FLIGHT 93 NATIONAL MEMORIAL FINAL GENERAL MANAGEMENT
PLAN/ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACr STATEMENT, Ch. IV, Table IV-1 (2006) [hereinafter
FLIGHT 93 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT].
51 J. Peter Byrne, Hallowed Ground: The Gettysburg Baulefield in Historic Preservation Law, 22
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 203, 213 (2009) (explaining that battlefield parks were transferred from
the War Department to the National Park Service in 1933 and that "[t]he NPS, founded
in 1916, had become heavily involved with historic preservation during the 1920s. ... the
NPS institutionalized historic preservation expertise within the federal government. In
1935, Congress entrusted the NPS with important duties under the Historic Sites Act,
which enhanced professional standards for the appraisal of proposed historic landmarks
and tools for preservation. The landmark 1966 National Historic Preservation Act
(NHPA) confirmed the role of the NPS in establishing the criteria and administrative
processes for the National Register of Historic Places. . . ." (internal citations omitted)).
52 National Park Service, Minutes of the Flight 93 Advisory Commission, at 26 (Feb. 20, 2004).
53 The process for such a designation is governed by the National Parks Omnibus Manage-
ment Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-391) which requires an in-depth study of any proposed addi-
tions.
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ria were self-evidently satisfied. Smith, of the Park Service, comment-
ed that the usual process is to wait a "sufficient interval of time to al-
low for historical judgment. Yet, the events of September 11th are so
clearly important to contemporary America that some kind of na-
tional recognition is appropriate now.""4 Congress's designation of
the site as a national memorial and a unit of the National Park Ser-
vice also meant that it was "automatically listed" in the National Reg-
ister of Historic Places." While the normal practice was to wait fifty
years for a historic designation, the Park Service later wrote that the
"Flight 93 National Memorial is a historic site that is commemorative
in nature. National memorials frequently consist wholly or partly of
agency created resources that are historic because they are commem-
orative."5 In other words, the Park Service was able to accommodate
this unusual "instant" heritage.
The Flight 93 law created a process to develop plans for an ap-
propriate memorial, and it created an organization, the Flight 93 Ad-
visory Commission, composed of relevant governmental and interest-
ed parties, to aid in that undertaking. It permitted purchase of land
for the memorial (the law initially did not appropriate any funds for
the project, which over time would expand to more than 2,000 acres
and cost about $70 million) ,5 from "willing sellers."5  But the frame-
work of commemoration, heritage and parks was not able to contain
the process that followed without challenge. In particular, notions of
the sacred and the import of Bell's "intangible" value were still to be
negotiated and litigated.
B. Menwrial Design: Sacred Ground And Wounded Nature
In 2004, the Park Service's announcement of its international de-
sign competition for a national memorial explained that the "crash
site, now considered sacred ground, will become a ... national me-
morial."59 The winning bid, selected out of over one thousand en-
54 Hearing on H.R 2099, H.R. 3917 and H.R. 4874 Before the Subcomm. on National Parks, Recre-
ation, and Public Lands ofthe H. Comm. on Resources, 107th Cong. 19 (2002) (statement of P.
Daniel Smith, Special Assistant to the Director, National Park Service, U.S. Department of
the Interior).
55 FLIGHT 93 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 50, at 16.
56 Id.
57 Peirce, supra note 36; see also, Paul Murdoch, Flight 93 National Memorial Design Presen-
tation (n.d.), http://www.nps.gov/flni/upload/Design%20presentatioN2.pdf.
58 Flight 93 National Memorial Act, Pub. L. No. 107-226, § 5(8), 116 Stat. 1345, 1345 (2002)
(stating the Secretary of the Interior is empowered to make purchases).
59 National Park Service, Design Completion Announcement, [vid-
eo] http://www.nps.gov/flni/photosmultimedia/upload/flight_93_mac.mov.
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tries,60 was by architect Paul Murdoch. Murdoch centered his design
around the crash site, which he also called the "Sacred Ground.""
Visitors would enter from the north, following the plane's route and
walk through a tall structure, which Murdoch called the "Tower of
Voices.""' The tower "houses 40 wind chimes that present through
sound a living memory of the passengers and crewmembers. The last
memory of many was through their voices on calls from Flight 93, and
of the rushing wind.""
The site then opened onto a large bowl-shaped field, which Mur-
doch called the "Field of Honor." In his design, the perimeter of the
bowl is planted with two semi-circles of trees, a "national gesture of
embrace that orients visitors toward the Sacred Ground." Visitors can
approach the sacred space, "but not enter." On the other hand, fam-
ily members may do so." Murdoch envisioned a design that would be
"open to interpretation":
Most importantly, the design is an open circle: Open to seasonal change,
maturity over time and open to personal interpretation through multiple
memorial and landscape experiences. It is not just a closed, singular
form. The memorial walls near the entrance open to the western land-
scape. Those walls frame the open sky above the flight path. The memo-
rial groves open the circle along lines that radiate out from its center.
Rebuilt wetlands span the bowl edge, opening natural habitat between
the memorial and landscape beyond. Different vanta e points around
the bowl offer vistas of the countryside beyond the park.
The theme of healing the land became increasingly prominent in ex-
plaining the design-healing it not only from the crash, but also from
strip mining. By healing the former mining site, visitors would be
healed too. One can detect an alternative to the "sacred" status of
the crash site in the restorative powers of nature." A Park Service
video explains:
The vistas still hint at its mining history. But, today, the life of this land is
being restored. It is now healing. And, in return, nourishing our souls
60 National Park Service, Flight 93: International Design Competition,
http://www.nps.gov/flni/learn/management/intldesigncomp.htn.
61 Paul Murdoch, Flight 93 National Memorial Design Presentation (n.d.),
http://www.nps.gov/flni/upload/Design%20presentatioN2.pdf.
62 Id.
63 Id.; see also Murdoch Answers Questions About Flight 93 Memorial Design, DAILY AMERICAN,
Sept. 10, 2008, http://articles.dailyamerican.com/2008-09-
10/news/26316839 1_memorial-design-paul-murdoch-consultant-team.
64 Paul Murdoch, Flight 93 National Memorial Design Presentation, supra note 60.
65 See Murdoch Answers Questions About Fight 93 Memorial Design, supra note 62.
66 For a conception of nature as occupying the place of the sacred in contemporary juris-
prudence, see Carol M. Rose, Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creators: Traditions of Public
Property in the Information Age, 66J.L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 109 (2003).
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[at this point in the video there are images of ducks beside a pond]. The
fields, wooded groves, and rolling hills that bore witness to incredible vio-
lence are now a final resting place and lasting testament to forty extraor-
dinary people aboard Flight 93.
Unlike the spontaneous, messy, popular memorial that members of
the public created (which included crucifixes and an endless assort-
ment of odds and ends), Murdoch's "sacred" did not have an explicit-
ly religious or nationalistic dimension. It is a supposedly post- or non-
religious vaguely spiritual sacred site tied to nature," while also aus-
tere, controlled, and non-commercial. His sacred derives its senti-
mentality not from the political domain or kitsch commercialism, but
rather from nature. The overlaying of the sacred by nature is ex-
pressed in particularly literal form by the 2011 installation of a 17-ton
"native sandstone boulder" on top of the crash site "mark[ing]"
where the 'journey of flight 93 ended so violently." 9 It is as though
the sacred ground of Murdoch's original design was too vacant. Na-
ture, in the form of a "native" boulder, rendered the sacred tangible.
C. From Sacred To Sacrilege
In emphasizing what he saw as interpretive openness, however,
Murdoch left his design open to misinterpretation. The turn to na-
ture took place amidst attacks against the design for its perceived Is-
lamic symbolism. It was a sacred design, but in the wrong sense, ac-
cording to these critics. Among them, Alec Rawls was perhaps the
most energetic: "If you let Murdoch plant the world's largest mosque
on the sacred ground where America's heroes died fighting, your
lives will be destroyed."o He posted online his book-length mono-
graph analyzing the design, Crescent of Betraya.1 At a 2008 Flight 93
Commission meeting, an attendee claiming to represent thousands of
people, Harry Beam, complained about the "Islamic symbolism" of
67 National Park Service, Fight 93 National Memorial Preview Summer 2011 [video]; Vicki
Rock, Flight 93 Impact Site to Be Marked With 17-ton Boulder, DAILY AMERICAN, July 30, 2011,
http://articles.dailyamerican.com/2011-07-30/news/29834768_lkeith-newlin-boulder-
impact-site.
68 Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Religion, Land, and Rights 12 (Institute for Advanced Study,
Working Paper No. 41 41, Dec. 2010).
69 National Park Service, Fight 93 National Memorial Preview Summer 2011 [video].
70 Daniel A. Griffith, An Assessment of Alec Rawls's 'Islamic and fihadist Design Features of the
Crescent/Bowl ofEmbrace', Jan. 5, 2007 (quoting Alec Rawls).
71 See ALEc RAwts, CRESCENT OF BETRAYAL: DISHONORING THE HEROES OF FLIGHT 93 xvI-xvII
(2007) (describing the purpose of the author's book and his reasons for scrutinizing the
memorial design).
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the design.2 The row of trees around the Field of Heroes was a Mus-
lim crescent, he thought, and the design pointed towards Mecca.
The minutes of the same Commission meeting record that a family
member defended the design:
Wow, such hate, I am totally blown away by this.' She goes on to say that
this is the site where their loved ones remain, and that when the oppo-
nents of the design insult the place and inflame the events, they are hurt-
ing them. . . . She has been involved in the process since day one, and
that she would never support any design that would support Muslims. . .
. She advised there is nothing anyone can do with the shape of the land.
It is a bowl, an embrace saying welcome home. Her husband would have
loved the place. There is an existing landscape to work with, and they
cannot change the place, nor alter it, because their loved one's remains
are there. She further states that the circle of trees around the bowl is
broken, because the land is broken and has been man-handled before;
now it is time to heal. A decision was made not to hurt the land any-
73
more.
The accusations of a hidden Islamic message were reported in the na-
tional press and trumpeted by national politicians.4 The Commission
took the explosive charges seriously: "Over the past few years, we
have reached out to experts in the areas of religious iconography, Is-
lamic Law/theology and memorial design."7 5  The Commission pre-
pared a "Chart of Facts" responding to questions such as: "Is the
memorial sited so that it faces Mecca?" The answer, the chart help-
fully responds, is that the memorial "is oriented toward the sacred
ground, the final resting place of the 40 heroes of Flight 93."
72 Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Flight 93 Federal Advisory Commission and Flight 93
Task Force 14 (May 3, 2008).
73 Id. at 16.
74 Included among these national politicians is U.S. Rep. Tom Tancredo (R-Colo). See Vicki
Rock, Congressman No Longer Critical of Right 93 Design, DAILY AMERICAN, JULY 25, 2008
("Two years ago, the congressman asked the National Park Service to revamp the memo-
rial. Last November, he asked the agency to direct the Flight 93 Federal Advisory Com-
mission to scrap the plan and start over. At that time, he said the original design, first
called the Crescent of Embrace, was questionable because of the crescent's prominent
use as a symbol in Islam and the fact that the hijackers were radical Islamists.").
75 Statement of Gordon Felt, President, Families of Flight 93 (May 2, 2008); see also Sum-
mary from R. Kevin Jacques, Assistant Professor, Department of Religious Studies, Indi-
ana University (Feb. 27, 2007) ("Rawls has a fundamental flaw in his reasoning, namely:
just because something is 'similar to' something else, does not make it the 'same.' I
doubt that anything I, or any except in Islamic architecture or mosque design, could say
would satisfy him. A typical example of this is on page 40 where he gives the shapes of
two maple trees and says that because the shape is vaguely similar to the space created by
an arch, they are the same thing. He then shows a single evergreen and says that because
the shape is similar to a pointed arch, it is the same thing.").
76 National Park Service, Chart of Facts about the Memorial Design (n.d.).
Apr. 2016] 1193
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Perhaps in response to the controversy, the National Park Service
dropped its use of the term "sacred ground" in its description of the
memorial plan. The area that on Murdoch's map (still on the NPS
website) was labeled "Sacred Ground" is now not labeled at all.77 In-
stead, the adjacent sliver of land is called "Memorial Plaza and Arrival
Court."" In contrast to Murdoch's interpretative "openness," the de-
sign description now available on the Park Service website is highly
prescriptive, telling the visitor what each feature "symbolizes."9 A
"rugged gate," for instance, reminds us-we are told-of the
"strength and resolve" of passengers and crew."
In sum, Congress classified the site as a memorial and as heritage
and located it within the Park System. But the site exceeded that le-
gal and policy structure for many people. Calling it sacred clearly
meant a variety of things-but not all could be included in the Park
Service's plans. Murdoch invoked a notion of sacred that was calm
and reflective, and intersected with nature and seasonal change. In
response, he was accused of bringing forward a different kind of sa-
cred. Subsequently, this interpretative openness was supplemented
by explicit guidance explaining the design's details, and by a sus-
tained emphasis on the theme of nature. In what follows, I turn to
the question of what these varying conceptions of the sacred suggest
in terms of how the land's value was understood and calculated.
II EMINENT DOMAIN AND JUST COMPENSATION FOR SACRED LAND
While the Park Service and the Flight 93 Commission fought back
accusations that their chosen design contained Islamic iconography
through 2008, another problem was coming into focus. They still did
not own the essential parcel-the crash site, the sacred ground. It
was empowered under the 2002 law only to acquire land from "will-
ing sellers."8 ' As time wore on, it became increasingly apparent that
there was a problem in settling on a price with the landowner. Ap-
parently attuned to the possible positive effects of owning sacred
property, the landowner was reported to want a substantial premi-
77 National Park Service, Fight 93 Site Plan.
78 Id.
79 National Park Service, Visiting Fight 93 (Feb. 5, 2016),
http://www.nps.gov/flni/learn/photosmultimedia/virtualtour.htm [video] ("Concrete
walls are textured to evoke the region's barns . . . ." The shiny chips in a wall "remind us
of the coal mined from this land ... Benches are tapered reminiscent of plane wings.").
80 Id.
81 Flight 93 National Memorial Act, Pub. L. No. 107-226 § 5(8), 116 Stat. 1345, 1347 (2002).
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um.12  Frustration mounted as it appeared that memorial construc-
tion might not be underway by the tenth anniversary of the attacks."
In late 2007, Congress empowered the Department of the Interior
(containing the Park Service) to invoke eminent domain.84 The deci-
sion to use that power caused a minor outcry for violating private
property rights and caused two of the Commission's members to re-
sign in protest.5 In 2009, the government took the land through a
condemnation proceeding filed in federal court and then began to
litigate the amount of compensation owed."
This Part focuses on the efforts to determine the monetary value
of the property where the sacred ground is located-a 275-acre par-
cel belonging to a family-owned quarry company, Svonavec, Inc."
The questions focused on are how and whether the land's sacred sta-
tus impacts its monetary value, and whether the landowner should be
awarded whatever enhancement in value is attributed to the attacks.
First, this Part briefly lays out the legal context of takings jurispru-
dence and suggests that, at first glance, the landowner is to receive
any enhancement in market value due to the attacks because com-
pensation is usually determined by the market value at time of taking.
Second, this Part examines the ways in which the government, the
landowner, the district court and its appointed Commission of local
real estate experts, approached the question of value-with a particu-
lar focus on the dueling expert appraisals. As I describe in that Part,
all of these parties imply accepted without argument that if the 9/11
82 See, e.g., Paula Reed Ward, How Much is the Flight 93 Crash Site Worth?, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE, Jan. 18. 2009, http://www.post-gazette.com/local/region/2009/01/18/How-much-is-
the-Flight-93-crash-site-worth/stories/200901180243 (stating that the owner thinks the land is
worth $50 million, but would accept $10 million).
83 See Sean D. Hamill, Flight 93 Families Reach Out to Bush, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2009, at All
(reporting on demands made by families of the victims due to the slow process of getting
the land for the memorial site).
84 Consolidated Appropriations Act, § 128, 121 Stat. 1844, 2122 (2007) (amending Public
Law 107-226 (Flight 93 National Memorial Act) to: (1) remove the requirement that the
land or interests in land for the memorial site be acquired from willing sellers; and (2)
authorize the acquisition of the land or interests by condemnation with donated or ap-
propriated funds).
85 See Vicki Rock, Law Change Allows Eminent Domain at Flight 93 Crash Site, DAILY AMERICAN,
Oct. 15, 2008; Mary Pickels, 2nd Flight 93 Memorial Board Member Resigns Over 'Eroded Trust',
TRIBLIVE, May 15, 2009, http://triblive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/regional/s_.625220.htmL
86 Notice of Declaration of Taking by United States of America, United States v. 275.81
Acres of Land, No. 3:09-cv-00233, 2014 BL 387242 (W.D. Pa. 2014), Doc. 2-1 [hereinafter
Declaration of Taking]; Notice of Condemnation by United States of America, United
States v. 275.81 Acres of Land, No. 3:09-cv-00233, 2014 BL 387242 (W.D. Pa. 2014), Doc.
3-1 [hereinafter Notice of Condemnation].
87 Sean D. Hamill, Flight 93 Families Reach Out to Bush, NEWYoRK TIMES,Jan. 10, 2009, at All
(describing Svonavec Inc. as "family-owned quarry company").
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attacks had increased the market value of the land, that this en-
hancement should accrue to the owner. I take issue with that as-
sumption in Part III.
A. Just Compensation
The Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that "private
property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion."m Much current discussion focuses on when a taking has oc-
curred, and, especially after the Supreme Court's decision in Kelo, on
the question of what is "public use.""9 Our focus, however, is on what
constitutes 'just compensation"; and there is very little guidance to be
found on the question of the fairness, equity, or justice of a private
landowner's benefitting from the value of their property as a site of
national tragedy.
'Just compensation" is usually described as "the full monetary
equivalent of the property taken. The owner is to be put in the same
position monetarily as he would have occupied if his property had
not been taken ... what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing
seller."o But just compensation may depart from market value to the
extent that the government's own project has impacted market value.
Under the "scope of the project" rule, changes in market value due to
the government's own actions should be excluded from the compen-
sation analysis: "Neither the Government nor the condemnee may
take advantage of 'an alteration in market value attributable to the
project itself."'9'
Applied to the Flight 93 site, it seems that the enhancement of
value due to the attack and the crash should be included in the
amount due as just compensation. The attack was not a government
project to create sacred ground on Svonavec's land. Indeed, it was a
government failure to prevent the attack that is a condition of the
value. It seems that it was the passengers, the hijackers, the United
Airlines plane, combined with a broad public interest in the site, that
created the enhancement. On the other hand, under the scope of
88 U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
89 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 479-80 (2005) (rejecting a requirement that
the land be used by the general public and instead applying a "public purpose" test).
90 Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 473-74 (1973)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
91 Id. at 480 (Powell, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16
(1970)). For the scope of the project rule, see Uniform Appraisal Standards for Federal
Land Acquisitions 46 [hereinafter "Uniform Appraisal Standards"] (defining the scope
of the project rule).
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the project rule, the portion of the increased value that can be at-
tributed to the government's decision to create a public memorial it-
self would not go to Svonavec.
It may be, however, that the market value that includes the "sa-
cred" value is not quite the $23 million windfall that Svonavec and
the "stigma" appraiser Bell envisage. The Department of Justice
guidelines for takings, the "Yellow Book," or the Uniform Appraisal
Standards for Federal Land Acquisitions, provides that the preferred
method of valuation is looking to comparable sales, which are diffi-
cult to establish in this case. Another form of valuation is "highest
and best use" which the appraiser may consider "if the property is
clearly adaptable to a [more profitable] use other than the existing
use . . . ... Perhaps at the sacred ground site, highest and best use
would be a for-profit memorial or a theme park related to the crash.
The Yellow Book provides that a "proposed highest and best use can-
not be the use for which the government is acquiring the property
(e.g., missile test range, habitat conservation, airfield, park), unless
there is a prospect and competitive demand for that use by others
than the government."9 4  If Svonavec could show that there is such
market demand, then it could avoid this problem of asserting the
same use as the government. Highest and best use must also be a le-
gal use and the appraiser can take into account zoning.9 5  If
Svonavec's plan were to create a for-profit memorial or theme park, it
might be a genuine problem for the appraiser to determine whether
such a use would be permitted. Indeed, Congress's designation of
the land as a national heritage site (not in itself a taking)" and a park
within the Park Service may entail some impediment to pursuing
profit above all else. But Svonavec cannot attempt o avoid the legal
use problem by saying that it intends a not-for-profit memorial. If it
92 Uniform Appraisal Standards, supra note 90, at 37 (noting comparable sales are the "best
evidence of market value").
93 Id. at 34; see also id. at 36 (explaining that "highest and best use is a most important con-
sideration in estimating market value").
94 Id. at 35.
95 Id. at 36 (noting the Yellow Book advises that the appraiser is to consider "physical possi-
bility, legal permissibility, financial feasibility, and its degree of profitability. That use
which meets the first three tests and is the most profitable use (i.e., results in the highest
value) is the property's highest and best use").
96 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1974) (holding that
there is no "taking" where the restrictions placed on the property are "substantially relat-
ed to the promotion of the general welfare and .. . permit reasonable beneficial use"); see
also Charles P. Lord, Stonewalling the Malls: just Compensation and Battlefield Protection, 77
VA. L. REv. 1637, 1656 (1991) (discussing "federal zoning" as a way to preserve historic
sites).
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wants to use the highest and best use methodology, it should
haveshown an "economic" use. A tentative summary of the appraisal
issues, then, suggested that Svonavec's award would include any en-
hanced "sacred" value; however, comparable sales valuation would be
inconclusive, and highest and best use as a for-profit memorial or
theme park would be discounted due to uncertainty around whether
it could truly operate a profit-making memorial.
B. Dueling Appraisals
This Part describes some of the steps leading up to the condemna-
tion proceeding, and then turns to the competing appraisals that the
government and the landowner submitted in court. Before the tak-
ing, Svonavec blamed the government for the delay because it had re-
fused to release its appraisals. Indeed, various parts of the govern-
ment (the Appraisal Services Directorate within the Department of
the Interior, the Park Service, the Department ofJustice) do seem to
have struggled with how to appraise the land, and how to include or
exclude its historic and "sacred" dimension. In one appraisal the
profit-making potential of the site due to its special status was includ-
ed. But the government refused to accept the appraisal, and commis-
sioned an evaluation of the appraisal. In another appraisal, commis-
sioned after the taking, the site's special status was excluded. The
government, I suggest, was properly seeking to exclude the sacred
value from the appraisal, but it lacks an explanation as to why this is
appropriate.
1. The Government's Appraisals: Including Or Setting Aside The Effects
Of 9/11
Before exercising its power of eminent domain, in 2008 the gov-
ernment received an appraisal from Utah-based LECG Corporation
("LECG"). The plane crash, the appraisal found, had tripled the val-
ue of the land, and it was now worth $1,530,000.9 Observing that
97 See Uniform Appraisal Standards, supra note 92, at 36 (stating the Department ofJustice's
"view is that an appraisal premised on a highest and best use of 'preservation,' 'conserva-
tion,' 'natural lands' and the like is not an appraisal of 'fair market value' and is unac-
ceptable for both direct purchase and eminent domain acquisitions .... Nor will it ap-
prove any appraisal report that incorporates a definition of highest and best use that in-
cludes the concept of non-economic uses").
98 Svonavec Inc.'s Motion to Exclude the Expert Testimony of Gregory Jones, Exhibit G,
LECG Self-Contained Appraisal Report, February 12, 2008, United States v. 275.81 Acres
of Land, No. 3:09-cv-00233, 2014 BL 387242 (W.D. Pa. 2014), Doc. 104-7 [hereinafter
LECG Self-Contained Appraisal Repor1. The appraisal was submitted to the Appraisal Ser-
[Vol. 18:41198
APPRAISING 9/11
"[m]arket comparables suggest that there is significant interest by
paying customers in facilities that memorialize national or interna-
tional tragedies," LECG found that use of the property as a private
memorial was likely the highest and best use.9" That is, "the value of
the Subject land for use in conjunction with a privately owned and
operated memorial far exceeds the agricultural and mining value."'"
Drawing on eleven case studies of memorial museums throughout
the U.S.,"o" LECG determined that entrance fees could be charged to
enter a museum and that revenues could be generated from a gift
shop and restaurant sales. In turn, a landowner could collect rent
from the museum operator."o2
LECG acknowledged that the market for a memorial is "shallow,"
meaning that there were not many buyers for this sort of property
and that it "is therefore necessary to identify the market."'03 It envi-
sioned a private memorial operating alongside "a non-profit entity.
Such an entity would have to be viewed as legitimate by stakeholders
in the Flight 93 event, which narrows but does not eliminate the pro-
spective market."'0
Significantly, LECG's analysis was rejected by the Appraisal Ser-
vices Directorate of the Department of the Interior, which noted that
"[b]ecause of this appraisal's attempt to justify a private memorial
value and being unable to do so, the report is deemed unacceptable
for use."'" Svonavec expressed its "shock" that the government would
"hide" the appraisal.0 "
vices Directorate, Kent Stevens, Lakewood, CO by Kabat and Cook, LECG of Salt Lake
City, UT. The Appraisal Services Directorate is an entity within the Department of Interi-
or.
99 Id. at 38-39.
100 Id.
101 United States' Reply Brief in Support of Its Motion to Exclude Defendant's Highest and
Best Use of the Subject Property, Exhibit 2, Colliers Pinkard Review of LECG Appraisal
Report of Svonavec, Inc. Property, United States v. 275.81 Acres of Land, No. 3:09-cv-
00233, 2014 BL 387242 (W.D. Pa. 2014), Doc. 118-2 at 7-8 [hereinafter Colliers Pinkard Re-
view of LECG Appraisal].
102 The entire LECG appraisal is not available. This summary is drawn from the Colliers
Pinkard review of the LECG Appraisal Report filed in 275.81 Acres of Land. Id. at 10.
103 LECG Self-Contained Appraisal Report, supra note 98, at 9.
104 Id. at 10.
105 Kirk Swauger, Flight 93 Land Battle Intensifies, TRIBUNE-DEMOCRAT, July 12, 2008,
http://tribdem.com/news/local news/flight-land-battle-intensifies/article_89074efa-
7811-5760-9all -adde3847eaed.html (quoting a 2008 letter from Kent Stevens, of the Ap-
praisal Services Directorate, to Pam McLay, a Deputy Realty Officer for the National Park
Service).
106 Id.
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Subsequently, but still before the taking, the Park Service hired an
appraiser to review the LECG appraisal.'7 Colliers Pinkard, in its re-
port of November 2008, recommended rejecting the LECG analysis:
To suggest a narrow and unique use for the property as the basis for val-
uation is contrary to the definition of market value. Setting aside for a mo-
ment the property's unique historic significance, this property is typical of dozens of
rural sales in Somerset County that can provide an indication of typical
uses of similar rural land sold in the market area. These include
cropland, pasture, timber, recreation and farmette home sites.108
While LECG had placed the "unique historic significance" of the site
at the heart of its analysis of value, Colliers Pinkard saw this as an er-
ror. Market value, it contended, was to be determined where buyer
and seller are "typically motivated," where price was not affected by
the "undue stimulus" of the unique event.' Rather than being mis-
led by an eccentric, overly stimulated market value, Colliers Pinkard
saw value as that which is determined in a "broader marketplace," as
seen in comparable sales. Market value entailed "setting aside for a
moment the property's unique historic significance" to determine
what were the typical uses of land in the area and how they are val-
ued.
In an important part of its report, Colliers Pinkard wrote that
LECG's "highest and best use conclusion differs little from a public inter-
est use for which a narrowly defined buyer market will pay a price
premium, leading to a result in the LECG appraisal that borders on
public interest value."0 That is, the market that LECG identified was
composed of private individuals who were publicly motivated (includ-
ing groups such as Families of Flight 93)-parties wishing to preserve,
as LECG put it, "this piece of history for the edification of present
and future generations.""' This description is important in that the
idea of market value in this context is understood in terms of a "pri-
vate" market, one motivated by profit (recall the earlier discussion of
appraisal basics where the highest and best use must be "econom-
ic").112
107 Colliers Pinkard Review of LECG Appraisal, supra note 101, at 8. The review of LECG's ap-
praisal was conducted by Terry Dunkin and Gregory Jones of Colliers Pinkard for Pam
McLay, Chief of Business Services for the National Park Service's Northeast Region. Id. at
4.
108 Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
109 Id.
110 Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
111 LECG Self-Contained Appraisal Report, supra note 97, at 9.
112 See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
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Rather than develop its insight, Colliers Pinkard cordoned off the
significance of that special market demand and appraised the land as
though Flight 93 had not crashed there: "Presumption of such a nar-
row special-purpose use disregards the property's value in the eyes of
the broader marketplace. In rural Somerset County, large land par-
cels are mostly used for agriculture, . . . homesites[,] [etc.]."" Colli-
ers Pinkard also argued that even if valued as a memorial, LECG had
underestimated the financial risk. The land residual technique
LECG used-which calculated the profits from entrance fees to set a
value for the land-was highly likely to be thrown off by minor
changes in inputs.1 4 While LECG had treated the land as the same
investment grade as a shopping center, Colliers Pinkard objected
that:
In our view it is improbable that a prudent investor would pay a substan-
tial price premium for rural land on the premise that a proposed muse-
um operator would pay well above market rent to locate a facility there,
notwithstanding the historic significance of that specific site. The immedi-
ate area of the Flight 93 crash itself will always remain hallowed ground, but a
museum and memorial could be built offsite.... Competition from ad-
joining parcels vying for the museum would tend to moderate the rent or
land price to a rate commensurate with the intrinsic value of land in the
113
surrounding area.
Thus, Colliers Pinkard rejected LECG's analysis that had included the
value of the site as a profit-generating memorial."" It did not deny
that there was something special about the land ("it will always re-
main hallowed ground"), but contended that this was not necessarily
of any economic importance. Colliers Pinkard (and the government,
as we will see) ended up in the odd position of appraising the land as
if it were empty farmland. If it seemed surprising for the stigma spe-
cialist, Bell, to include the effects of the attacks as an amount owed
the owner, it is perhaps more surprising to find that after the attack
the highest and best use included farming, grazing, and home sites."
Subsequently, in September 2009, the government took the prop-
erty through a declaration of taking"8 and, in November 2010, the
Department of Justice obtained another appraisal to use in the con-
demnation proceeding."9 In the appraisal by Cassidy Turley, the ex-
113 Coltiers Pinkard Review ofLECG Appraisa4 supra note 100, at 14.
114 Id.
115 Id. (emphasis added).
116 Id. at 16.
117 Id. at 11, 14.
118 See Declaration of Taking, supra note 85.
119 United States' Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Exclude the Expert Tes-
timony of Gregory Jones, Exhibit 2, Cassidy Turley Appraisal of Svonavec, Inc. Property,
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clusion of the land's historical or sacred significance was better de-
veloped than in the Colliers Pinkard Report. "Sacred" seemed to
mean set apart and excluded from the valuation analysis: "An esti-
mated 6 acres around the crash site would be reserved as sacred
ground, left undisturbed in perpetuity. That leaves about 265 acres
for development.,1 2 0 The appraisal then asked about the highest and
best use of that remainder and, again, found that the land had a vari-
ety of uses, including cropland, hunting, grazing, and farmettes.12 1
The Cassidy Turley appraisal expanded upon the analysis of the
Colliers Pinkard report and, in fact, shared an author, Gregory
Jones1 22 (Jones was one of the government's experts at trial, and I will
refer to the Turley report as Jones's).' Finding that the land was
worth about the same as its pre-9/11 value, Jones's valuation was
$600,000.24 Jones seemed to exclude the sacred ground from his
analysis of the site's dollar value:
Notwithstanding the prospective uses of the surrounding acreage, the vi-
cinity of the impact site would in any event be preserved as an undisturbed
sacred ground forever, as would a cemetery. Suffice it to say, any buyer of the
property would likely be expected to keep a respectable distance between the impact
site and any incompatible use."'
In this appeal to propriety, to a "respectable distance," Jones excludes
the crash site from his evaluation. He does not explain how this ap-
peal to propriety conforms with the appraisal guidelines and the clear
demand that only "economic" considerations be included.1 2 6  For
Jones, the sacred value is visible only in the way it might affect the
surrounding acres-if, for instance, they could be profitably used for
a visitor's center. He considered whether a portion of the property
United States v. 275.81 Acres of Land, No. 3:09-cv-00233, 2014 BL 387242 (W.D. Pa. June
10, 2014), Doc. 110-2 [hereinafter Cassidy Turley Appraisal Part I]. This appraisal was pre-
pared by Gregory Jones of Cassidy Turley, a commercial real estate services firm located
in Baltimore, for Kristen Muenzen of the U.S. Department ofJustice's Environmental and
Natural Resources Division.
120 Id. at 23.
121 Svonavec, Inc.'s Motion to Exclude the Expert Testimony of Gregory Jones, Exhibit B,
Cassidy Turley Appraisal of Svonavec, Inc. Vroperty at 4, United States v. 275.81 Acres of
Land, No. 3:09-cv-00233, 2014 BL 387242 (W.D. Pa. June 10, 2014), Doc. 104-2 [hereinaf-
ter Cassidy Turley Appraisal Part Ii].
122 Id. at 5.
123 See, e.g., Svonavec Inc.'s Motion to Exclude the Expert Testimony of GregoryJones, Unit-
ed States v. 275.81 Acres of Land, No. 3:09-cv-00233, 2014 BL 387242 (W.D. Pa. June 10,
2014), Doc. 104 (attempting to exclude Gregory Jones's testimony as an expert witness
because his methods were flawed and unreliable).
124 Cassidy Turley Appraisal Part I, supra note 119, at 3.
125 Id. at 20 (emphasis added).
126 See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
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could be developed as a private memorial, but found "inadequate
support to determine that use to be financially feasible.""'
In sum, the government obtained appraisals which both included
and excluded the "sacred" value from its analysis of market value.
Considered together, they each laid out different approaches: the
historic or sacred value exists, and it has a market effect that can be
included in the appraisal (LECG); the land is sacred, which may have
market effect, but the market effect is really a public interest use (and
thus to be excluded) (Colliers Pinkard); the land is sacred and set
aside by the dictates of propriety, and has no market effect (Jones).
In other words, the first simply asks about the market value of the
crash. The latter two raise more complicated issues by asking about
the public nature of the use and raising a moral language of proprie-
ty. But they do so inadequately because-as real estate appraisers-
they apparently cannot put aside the formula of market value as the
measure ofjust compensation. That would be a task for the lawyers-
one, we will see, they too declined.
2. Randall Bell And The 'Pennanently Attached Intangible'Asset
The government wished to take the property because it was an ex-
ceptional site, but in the appraisal context and in its pleadings
seemed to treat the land as though it were any other land in rural
Pennsylvania. By contrast, for the landowner, the unique nature of
the land is central to its monetary value, not peripheral. The land-
owner had explained the inability to come to an agreement with the
government as due to the fact that the government had not released
its appraisals, including the LECG appraisal, which contemplated the
profitable use of the site as a memorial." But Svonavec did not pub-
licly make such assertions, and in one document seemingly agreed to
donate the sacred ground for free (one document signed by
Svonavec referenced the "intention of the Seller to donate to the
United States a certain, approximately six-acre sub-parcel at the crash
site . . . .) .12
127 Cassidy Turley Appraisal Part II, supra note 121, at 4.
128 Swauger, supra note 105 ("'We're shocked that they would reject this [LEGC] appraisal,'
said Mike Svonavec, secretary-treasurer for Svonavec Inc. 'After everything they've gone
through, we just can't believe they'd hide it. Put it out there, and we can get this
done.'").
129 United State's Response to Defendant's Application/Motion for Withdrawal of Estimated
Just Compensation, Exhibit 1, Agreement in Principle Among National Park Service,
Svonavec, Inc. and Families of Flight 93, at 3-4, United States v. 275.81 Acres of Land, No.
3:09-cv-00233, 2014 BL 387242 (W.D. Pa. June 10, 2014), Doc. 26-1.
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Randall Bell, the "Master of Disaster" encountered earlier, con-
ducted an appraisal for Svonavec in December 2011 and valued the
land at $23 million.'30 Where the government's appraiser Jones (au-
thor of the Colliers Pinkard and Cassidy Turley reports) saw the
property as normal land, with the admitted exception of the "sacred
ground," Bell's analysis is premised on the unique nature of the land.
Unlike Jones, however, Bell does not call the land "sacred"-perhaps
this would interfere with his interest in asserting the easy conversion
of the land's special quality into money. As we saw, in his deposition
Bell expressed his view about the unique nature of the site containing
a "permanently attached intangible" form of value: The intangible
value is attached to that property permanently, and so it's appropri-
ate to look at the income that's going to be generated as a conse-
quence of that permanently attached intangible and estimate the rev-
enues from it.'
In his appraisal, Bell sought to determine the land's value as a
memorial and visitor center. He collected comparable data from the
seventeen sites of "national and international interest," including the
Murrah Federal Building, the Alamo, Graceland, the Hiroshima
Peace Memorial, the Empire State Building, the Statue of Liberty,
and Gettysburg, among others. He attempted to determine the "net
concession income" per attendee and the amount that a bookstore
and restaurant might generate. Further, the "projected net operating
income [would be] capitalized to yield a value that [was] indicative of
the price an investor or developer may pay for the subject proper-
ty,"132 and he arrived at a value of $23 million or $1.94 per square
foot."' (This figure, as the U.S. pointed out, is a generous $84,500
per acre,13 4 rather more than the $1,500-2,500 typical of the area ' 5 ).'3 6
130 United States' Motion to Exclude Defendant's Use of Certain Studies Employed By De-
fendant's Appraiser Randall Bell as Irrelevant Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
71.1 and Federal Rules of Evidence 402 and 403, Exhibit 1, Expert Report of Randall Bell,
MAI, at 27, United States v. 275.81 Acres of Land, No. 3:09-cv-00233, 2014 BL 387242
(W.D. Pa. June 10, 2014), Doc. 103-1 [hereinafter Expert Report ofRandall Bell.
131 Bell Deposition, supra note 1, 77:22-78:2.
132 Expert Report of Randall Bell, supra note 130, at 7.
133 Id. at 18 (referencing a table summarizing land residual calculation).
134 United States' Rule 71.1(h) Motion and Memorandum to Exclude Defendant's Highest
and Best Use of the Subject Property as a Memorial and Related Visitor Center at 16,
Flight 93 National Memorial and the Flight 93 Museum, United States v. 275.81 Acres of
Land, No. 3:09-cv-00233, 2014 BL 387242 (W.D. Pa. June 10, 2014) [hereinafter "United
States' Rule 71.1(h) Motion"].
135 Paula Reed Ward, How Much is the Flight 93 Crash Site Worth?, PITTSBURGH PosT-GAZETTE,
Jan. 18. 2009, http://www.post-gazette.com/local/region/2009/01/18/How-much-is-the-Flight-93-
crash-site-worth/stories/200901180243 (quoting local realtor for price information).
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Bell also expressed his confidence in the staying power of the special
value: "The subject site is of considerable national significance,
which sets it apart from vacant land with no commercially viable use.
The subject property is considered secure from an investment stand-
point."1
But Bell does not only apply a market logic. He too acknowledges
moral and non-market considerations and did not envision a purely
for-profit memorial. From the portions of his appraisal currently
available, it is not clear how he envisions the free and paid parts of
the memorial intersecting. One example of Bell's thinking on this
matter is a business proposal he sent to Svonavec in 2003. (Bell, in
addition to serving as Svonavec's appraiser in 2011, had been in con-
tact with Svonavec shortly after the 9/11 attacks. Early on, Bell ob-
tained the internet domain names to Flight 93 websites, and in 2007
Bell entered into a joint venture with Svonavec to assist in selling the
crash site in exchange for 10% of the sale.)"" In the business pro-
posal, Bell suggested a "Flight 93 National Memorial" that would be a
not-for-profit, open to all for free, which would "honor those heroes
that died there that day."'39 For an "in depth look," visitors would pay
to enter the Flight 93 Museum.'4 This Museum would provide a view
of the "'Circle of Heroes"' encircling the crash site and feature "dis-
plays, a theater featuring a proprietary documentary, and a
bookstore."41 While it would be possible to charge money to walk on
the Circle of Heroes, Bell's proposal expresses a concern as to wheth-
er that money could go to a for-profit entity. The proposal provides
136 Bell claimed that one could charge $9 per person to enter a paying component of the
Flight 93 site. Moreover, bookstore and concession net income would be $4 per person.
Expert Report of Randall Bell, supra note 130, at 16 (citing market data projected net in-
come). Bell estimated that 230,000 persons would visit per year, and that 184,000 of
those would pay for entrance to the visitor's center. Id. Bell anticipated $1.6 million in
admissions; with a net income of $1.1 million income; adding in bookstore and conces-
sions brought income up to $1.8 million; at a 7% capitalization rate less construction
costs he came up with his final figure. Id.
137 Id. at 17.
138 United States' Rule 71.1(h) Motion, supra note 134. The agreement describes a joint
venture between Bell, as holder of "intellectual property," i.e., the domain names includ-
ing Flight93NationalMemorial.org, and Svonavec, as owner of the crash site. Id, at 2. It
anticipates a sale to a third party and acknowledges that the site, because of a "high level
of national and international interest ... has the potential for the generation of consid-
erable revenues." Id. They agree to sell their properties together as a "combined pack-
age," and agree that Bell will prepare a prospectus, identify and contact prospective pur-
chasers, and is to receive 10% share of the sale or lease. Id. at 2-5.
139 United States' Rule 71.1(h) Motion, supra note 134, at Exhibit 12 at 4.
140 Id.
141 Id.
Apr. 2016] 1205
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
that "100% of all such proceeds will go to . That is, the
draft left blank who should benefit. We might construe this wonder-
ful empty line as the typographic expression of the confrontation
with "sacred" value-it cannot be touched. This money is marked
and set aside in some special way. The blank line suggests a concern
that one cannot take those funds for the profit-making museum. On-
ly later in the document is the matter resolved: this special money
will go to the victims' families. The clarity emerged in the section on
investment "risks" which, Bell noted, "include political pressures from
surrounding residents, survivors[] [groups] and September 11th ac-
tivist groups."1 4
Bell's proposal mediates the special nature of the land and finan-
cial return by creating a three part structure-free, paid, and dona-
tion-and determining that it would only be acceptable to turn a
profit from the intermediate space. That is, the space between the
public and the sacred is the market. This spatial segregation of the
sacred is mirrored in the legal structure Bell envisaged. In a 2003
email he suggested that there be two entities, a "trust or corporation
that can disperse earnings [and] ... a non-profit corporation that
can accept donations .. . for the National Memorial and families."'
Despite their differences, Bell and Jones agree on many points.
Both share the idea that the sacred or intangible cannot be valued as
such, only as expressed in some other form, such as entrance fees.
They agree that there must be some free access to the public, and we
might interpret this to mean that the sacred cannot be fully "owned"
by any party. (I return to this point in Part III where I compare the
enhanced value in this case to a windfall.) Finally, it is agreed that at
least the sacred ground, the crash site, will be a memorial, not some-
thing else entirely. Where they differ is how this special or set-aside
land interacts with the broader context. Jones, the government ap-
praiser, seems to acknowledge it but then treats the land as fungible
and akin to other land in the area. Bell, by contrast, seems to dwell
on the sacred value, even while he declines to follow everyone else
and use that term. Of these two, Bell's analysis seems to capture an
important truth, that 9/11 probably has had a positive market impact
(although his instincts may have led him astray when he mused
142 Id.
143 Id. at 5. Finally, and after estimating in his proposal annual net profit of $500,000 to 2.5
million, Bell came to the question of "exit strategies" and how to cash out: "Preferred div-
idends of % will be paid to the preferred shareholders, and any dividends will then be
paid to common stock holders." Id.
144 United States' Rule 71.1(h) Motion, supra note 134, at Exhibit 11 at 2.
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whether United Airlines might be a corporate sponsor) ."' As argued
below, however, whether that enhanced value exists should be seen as
a separate question from whether it is to be included in determining
what constitutes just compensation.
C. Sacred To 'Vacant' Land
Following the exchange of the appraisers' expert reports in 2012,
the government and Svonavec filed a flurry of motions attacking one
another's appraisals. The word "sacred" drops out of the debate-
unlike Murdoch, Jones and the Park Service, the Department of Jus-
tice lawyers and Svonavec's counsel do not use the term. As the valu-
ation dispute moved towards a trial, the government focused on con-
testing the notion that there was any 9/11-related enhancement in
value. In counterpoise to Bell's "intangible" value, the government
described the land as "vacant."]4 It contended, in contrast to the no-
tion that the land was sacred or had some intangible value, that the
site is "raw land."14 In response to Bell's contention that the land has
been a private memorial since 9/11, the government's rejoinder is
that "[t] here was no 'something' on the subject property ... that rep-
resented a memorial. . . ."'48 This characterization bolsters the gov-
ernment's argument that Bell's financial projections are speculative:
Most significantly, there was no operating memorial on the subject prop-
erty on the date of taking. Defendant appears to put forth the notion
that a "memorial" is the property itself, and that because Flight 93
crashed on the subject property, the entire property is, in and of itself, a
memorial. According to the Merriam Webster Dictionary, a memorial is
"[s] omething, as a monument or a holida designed or established to pre-
serve the memory of a person or event.' dr
The land was a "vacant strip mine," not a memorial.15 o In the gov-
ernment's narration, a memorial must be built, planned, and con-
structed-for instance, "rather than simply maintaining vacant land
145 Id.
146 United States' Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Exclude the Expert Tes-
timony of Gregory Jones at 15, United States v. 275.81 Acres of Land, No. 3:09-cv-00233,
2014 BL 387242 (W.D. Pa. June 10, 2014), Doc. 110.
147 United States' Rule 71.1(h) Motion to Exclude the Valuation Testimony of Defendant's
Appraiser Randall Bell at 23, United States v. 275.81 Acres of Land, No. 3:09-cv-00233,
2014 BL 387242 (W.D. Pa. June 10, 2014), Doc. 106 [hereinafter Rule 71.1(h) Motion to
Exclude Randall Bell Testimony].
148 United States' Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Exclude the Expert Tes-
timony of Gregory Jones at 15, United States v. 275.81 Acres of Land, No. 3:09-cv-00233,
2014 BL 387242 (W.D. Pa.June 10, 2014), Doc. 110.
149 Id. at 14 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).
150 Id. at 15.
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to commemorate the loss and heroic actions of the Flight 93 passen-
gers, the National Park Service plans to develop a 'permanent memo-
rial' on the property."' '
The issue of whether there was a memorial on the site was also
relevant to Bell's use of an income capitalization approach (first es-
timating profits, then amortizing these to arrive at a present day dol-
lar amount). If there was nothing there, the use of this approach
seems especially speculative, and Svonavec had "failed to explain why
an income approach is a proper valuation method to value vacant
land."'5  This gets to a central issue-that the land is the source of
value, it is the "business."'53 It was in response to this formulation that
Bell's conceptualization-the "intangible asset attached to this prop-
erty in perpetuity that's going to generate income"-became perti-
nent since it attempted to capture the nature of the value that had
been created as "something" and yet also nothing; as a memorial, and
yet also an absence.
Confronted with such existential real estate niceties, we can have
sympathy for the government. And the government is right in a lit-
eral sense: it is an empty field. Nonetheless, it does seem as though
the government was not confronting precisely what is interesting
about the case-for lack of a better word, that they are taking "sa-
cred" land. Over 100,000 people per year had visited the site,'5 leav-
ing tens of thousands of objects and memorabilia.'"5 As Svonavec puts
it: "Yet the Government and Jones would lead us to believe that these
people were simply showing up to see 'open space used for cropland,
grazing, hunting and recreation, farmettes and large-tract home
sites.""5  This duality of something and nothing is precisely the point
at which the sacred, and Bell's intangible value, enters the policy and
market reality of the situation. And if it is simply vacant land, why
151 Id. at 14.
152 United States' Reply in Support of its Motion to Exclude the Valuation Testimony of De-
fendant's Appraiser Randall Bell at 1, United States v. 275.81 Acres of Land, No. 3:09-cv-
00233, 2014 BL 387242 (W.D. Pa.June 10, 2014), Doc. 119.
153 Rule 71.1(h) Motion to Exclude Randall Bell Testimony, supra note 147, at 2 ("Most
egregiously, Mr. Bell used an income approach to determine the market value of vacant
land .... The rest of Mr. Bell's errors flow from this decision .... Finally, Mr. Bell did
not even correctly apply the version of the income approach - the land residual tech-
nique - he chose to use; this resulted in him valuing a business, as opposed to the land the
United States actually acquired.").
154 Peirce, Flight 93 Memorial, supra note 36.
155 Rock, supra note 35.
156 Svonavec, Inc.'s Reply to United States' Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Exclude the Expert Testimony of Gregory Jones at 3, United States v. 275.81 Acres of
Land, No. 3:09-cv-00233, 2014 BL 387242 (W.D. Pa. June 10, 2014), Doc. 122.
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does the government wish to take it? Of course the answer is that the
government understands that there is something additional, whether
we call it heritage, sacred, or intangible value, but because it either
thinks that the additional feature has no market value or doesn't
want to pay for that something extra, it avoids naming it. In sum, the
government continued down the road its appraiser started out on-
displacing the effects of 9/11.
The government made a number of attacks against the landown-
er's position, and they were partially successful. Bell's numbers, after
all, did seem optimistic. '" The government points out that Bell
should not assume that the change in value is positive:
[S] imply because an event happens on a property does not mean that the
property is 'more valuable' than it was before the event. Ostensibly this
type of argument could go the other way, as well, where the creation of a
hallowed resting place for the victims of Flight 93 may reduce the availa-
ble uses of the property and create a burden in the eyes of the prospec-
158
tive buyer.
And yet for the all the government's efforts, it did not explain how
the court should proceed if it determined that the crash did increase
the market value of the land. The unstated implication is that such
an enhancement is to go to Svonavec.
Svonavec artfully exploited the government's and Jones's desire to
leave 9/11 to the side and treat the land as though it were any other
land in rural Pennsylvania. Jones saw the highest and best use as
open space-and in his deposition again stated that "[b]ut for the
crash site, [the land] is very similar to many, many properties that
have been sold throughout the county." To this the lawyer respond-
ed: "But for the crash site?""9 And then followed up with another
question: "But for the Battle of Gettysburg, a field is there just like
any other field in central Pennsylvania; isn't that true?" Jones re-
sponded that he didn't want to "comment on Gettysburg."'" The
government correctly defended Jones by pointing out that he had
considered a private memorial financially infeasible and too specula-
157 See Rule 71.1(h) Motion to Exclude Randall Bell Testimony, supra note 144, at 2.
158 United States' Rule 71.1(h) Motion, supra note 134.
159 Svonavec, Inc.'s Motion to Exclude the Expert Testimony of GregoryJones at 12, United
States v. 275.81 Acres of Land, No. 3:09-ev-00233, 2014 BL 387242 (W.D. Pa. June 10,
2014), Doc. 104 (citing Ex. E, Transcript of the Testimony of Gregory Jones, Nov. 30,
2011).
160 Id.
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tive,1"' and yet it still stated thatJones ultimately "determined that the
highest and best use . . .was crops, grazing, hunting[, etc.]""
The government seemed to lose sight of the fact that there is a
"sacred" or "intangible" value that very likely will draw visitors and
hence revenue. What the government lacks is a conceptualization of
just compensation by which it can admit the reality of the situation
and still not pay the 9/11-related enhancement-which is what is of-
fered in the next Part.
D. The Trial And The Decision On Value
In October 2013, the parties convened for a five-day trial before
Judge Donetta W. Ambrose at he federal courthouse16 1 in Pittsburgh,
PA. The courthouse was mostly empty because of the shutdown of the
federal government in the wake of stalled budget negotiations in
Washington, DC (the Flight 93 Memorial was closed, causing com-
plaints about government interference in access to the site) '164 but the
cast of personalities-Mr. Svonavec, Bell, Jones, the government at-
torneys-were assembled. Before a Commission appointed by the
Court," consisting of two local real estate appraisers and one real es-
tate attorney, the parties presented their arguments. The Commis-
sion issued a 7 2-page report in December 2013, and determined that
just compensation for the land was $1,535,000.'6' In March 2014,
Judge Ambrose adopted the report in its entirety, presumably con-
cluding the litigation.1
How did the Commission arrive at this figure, more than double
the value of the land absent the 9/11-related enhancement, but far
less than the almost forty-fold increase argued for by the landowner?
The Commission adopted neither of the approaches urged upon it-
although it did not question the notion that just compensation was to
161 United States' Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Exclude the Expert Tes-
timony of Gregory Jones at 17 n.11, United States v. 275.81 Acres of Land, No. 3:09-cv-
00233, 2014 BL 387242 (W.D. Pa. June 10, 2014), Doc. 110.
162 Id. at 19.
163 United States v. 275.81 Acres of Land, No. 3:09-cv-00233, 2014 WL 1248205, at *1 (W.D.
Pa., 2014).
164 Renatta Signorini & Mary Pickels, Governmnent Shutdown Impacts Tourism at Flight 93 Na-
tional Memorial, Fort Necessity, TRIBLIVE.cOM (Oct. 10, 2013, 12:01 AM),
http://triblive.com/news/westmoreland/4842746-74/memoial-national-county.
165 Pursuant o FED. R. Civ. P. 71.1(h) (2) (A).
166 December 2013 Commission Report, supra note 5, at 71.
167 United States v. 275.81 Acres of Land, No. 3:09-cv-00233, 2014 WL 1248205, at *7- (W.D.
Pa., Mar. 26, 2014). In June 2014, the court issued a minor revision to this Order award-
ing interest to the landowner. United States v. 275.81 Acres of Land, No. 3:09-cv-00233,
2014 WL 2593888, at *6 (W.D. Pa.,June 10, 2014).
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be understood as market value at the time of taking."8 The highest
and best use of the property was neither crops, pasture, etc. (as the
government contended) nor a museum and visitor center (as the
landowner contended). Rather, the Commission struck out on its
own, and found that a reasonable buyer would have purchased the
property for use as a "private memorial,"' by which it meant a pub-
licly-accessible, privately-run, minimally-developed venue, which
would "have an optimum vantage of the crash site and provide an or-
ganized venue for observation, reflection and placement of memen-
tos. The real estate improvements would include a viewing area, off-
road parking, lighting and restroom facilities.""0 The Commission
disagreed with Bell that the highest and best use was a more elabo-
rate museum. Bell's financial figures were too speculative, the Com-
mission found, he lacked a marketability study,'7 ' and he conflated
the value of the land and the value of businesses which could be built
upon it, according to the Commission.'7 ' Taking the attendance fig-
ures from previous years, and assuming that visitors would pay a fee
to enter (three dollars), the Commission concluded that after ex-
penses the memorial would turn an annual profit of a little over
$200,000, or be worth just over $1.5 million. In sum, the Commis-
sion took a middle path between the government and its denial that a
memorial was the land's highest and best use, and Bell who envisaged
substantial infrastructure and great profits.
How did the Commission conceptualize the transformation of the
land into a memorial? It did not call the land sacred, but rather the
new status of the land is simply an "inescapable" and even obvious
fact:
[G]iven the heroic and historically significant events that led to it, once
the crash of Flight 93 occurred on the subject property, it was inescapable
that the property would be permanently preserved both as a place of hon-
or and as a burial ground."'
In other words, it was a given that the attacks had transformed the
land into a memorial site. The land was not "vacant" as the govern-
ment had contended. A memorial need not be a physical structure,
as the government urged, but rather according to the Commission,
168 December 2013 Commission Report, supra note 5, at 24.
169 Id. at 32.
170 Id. at 56.
171 Id. at 49-50.
172 Id. at 51-52.
173 December 2013 Commission Report, supra note 5, at 71.
174 Id. at 41.
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"the preservation of a place in perpetuity in honor of an event or per-
sons is what defines a memorial."'7  And, the Commission noted,
Jones had assumed that the crash site itself would remain untouched
(as we saw earlier, he states that it would be "left undisturbed ... as
sacred ground") .7 And yet even if the Commission is correct that
the site is a memorial, this fact is simply the point of departure from
which the Commission then enquires into the highest and best use.
Thus, for instance, strip mining the land for coal is not considered as
"such activity would not be consistent with the highest and best use of
the property as a private memorial."'77  A memorial serves as the
premise and benchmark from which to assess other uses as "appro-
priate" and fitting and "consistent" with that use. This premise is cor-
rect, it seems to me, but it is not an economic premise and seems to
fly in the face of the injunction that appraisals only consider econom-
ic uses. '7 It is more a political and social assertion, that the attacks
"inescapably" led to the land being a memorial. Whether this is the
highest and best economic use does not necessarily follow. There is a
prior, informal "taking" or transformation occasioned by the attacks
and by the public response. In fact, the Commission does offer one
description of how the transformation in the land occurred, stating
that through the attacks the land had been "committed" to being a
memorial:
In our view, as of the date of the taking, the subject property was a me-
morial, committed by the events that lead to the crash of Flight 93 on
September 11, 2001 to being preserved in perpetuity as a memorial to
events of that day and the heroes of Flight 93.'
The sentence sums up the situation well-and committing seems
vague in just the right way. Committed by who? Not the government,
for the Commission made clear that this transformation was inde-
pendent of any act on the part of the government, including Con-
gress's declaration that the site was to be a memorial in 2002.1e Ra-
ther, the committing was to be found, according to the Commission,
175 Id.
176 December 2013 Commission Report, supra note 5, at 42; Cassidy Turley Appraisal Par I,
supra note 127.
177 Id. at 48.
178 See Uniform Appraisal Standards, supra note 91, at 36 ("The Department ofjJustice's 'view
is that an appraisal premised on a highest and best use of 'preservation,' 'conservation,'
'natural lands' and the like is not an appraisal of 'fair market value' and is unacceptable
for both direct purchase and eminent domain acquisitions .... Nor will it approve any
appraisal report that incorporates a definition of highest and best use that includes the
concept of non-economic uses.'").
179 December 2013 Commission Report, supra note 24, at 54.
180 December 2013 Commission Report, supra note 5, at 42.
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in the events of 9/11 and the public response.'8' This was the infor-
mal, prior "taking," a committing as in a handing over, a pledging,
which is simply being formalized through the court process. In this
way, the court proceeding is less a taking than a recovery or securing
of something already given to-and taken by-the public. The
committing is the political and social act that grounds the Commis-
sion's supposedly dry economic appraisal. It plays the role of the sa-
cred in the Commission's text, the vague and yet central term that
accounts for the setting aside of an item from its everyday usage for
some special purpose. But the Commission did not question that
even though the land had been committed to serve as a memorial
that the landowner owned that increased value, and thus needed to
be compensated for it.
III. JUST COMPENSATION REVISITED
As noted, missing from the court proceedings is an examination
of the assumption that just compensation requires compensating the
owner for the enhanced post-9/11 value of the land. A mechanical
182application of takings doctrine does lead to that outcome . But ex-
amined more closely, there may be ways to argue against such a re-
sult. The textual command is to offer just compensation-that is, the
constitutional requirement concerns doing what is fair and equita-
ble.183
This Part begins by describing the authority supporting the claim
that just compensation concerns equity, and then discusses and dis-
tinguishes two precedents: the increase in value of the personal ef-
fects of Lee Harvey Oswald after he assassinated President John F.
Kennedy; and windfalls, which typically do accrue to the landowner
in the takings context. A final Part asks whether there is any doctri-
nal significance in the usage of the term "sacred" by some of the par-
ticipants, and argues that it draws attention to a legally relevant claim:
that the landowner never "owned" the enhanced value, and thus
need not be compensated for it.
A. just Compensation As Equity
Supreme Court precedent clearly recognizes that market value is
not the only measure of just compensation. As Justice Rehnquist ob-
181 Id. at 41.
182 See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
183 See infra notes 176-84 and accompanying text.
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served: "The constitutional requirement ofjust compensation derives
as much content from the basic equitable principles of fairness as it
does from technical concepts of property law."l8 4 Market value will
usually track what is equitable since that is the amount required for a
condemnee to purchase a replacement and thereby be made whole.
But market value will not invariably be equitable, and where that is
the case, courts have diverged from it. In United States v. Cors, a 1949
wartime takings case, Justice Douglas wrote that the
[Fifth] Amendment does not contain any definite standards of fairness
by which the measure of 'just compensation" is to be determined. The
Court in an endeavor to find working rules that will do substantial justice
has adopted practical standards, including that of market value. But it
has refused to make a fetish even of market value, since it may not be the
185
best measure of value in some cases.
A year later, in United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., Justice Hugo
Black wrote that "the dominant consideration always remains the
same: What compensation is 'just' both to an owner whose property
is taken and to the public that must pay the bill? The word 'just' in
the Fifth Amendment evokes ideas of 'fairness' and 'equity' ....
Market value is the usual measure, but when it "has been too difficult
to find, or when its application would result in manifest injustice to
owner or public, courts have fashioned and applied other stand-
ards."'
In sum, there is support for the claim (repeated outside of the
wartime context) ,18 that just compensation is to be understood in
terms of fairness and that market value is an appropriate tool so long
as it measures what is equitable. However, Cors and Commodities Trad-
184 United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 490 (1973) (citations omitted).
185 United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 332 (1949) (citations omitted).
186 United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U. S. 121, 123-24 (1950).
187 Id. at 123.
188 The important cases do not all involve war or emergency. They often concern complex
overlapping of private and public property, where the market value is enhanced by its
connection to public property. See United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 35-36
(1984) (identifying the challenges of valuing private property taken for public use);
Fuller, 409 U.S. at 493 (explaining that compensation is not required for "that element of
value based on the use of ... fee lands in combination with the Government's permit
lands."); Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. One Parcel of Land, 780 F. 2d 467, 471
(4th Cir. 1986) (holding that "just compensation" for condemned private property is lim-
ited to only the value of the unimproved property, ignoring any added value); United
States v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 538 F. 2d 1363, 1366 (9th Cir. 1976) (rejecting as "too nar-
row" the contention that Cors applies only to wartime or emergency contexts, and affirm-
ing the principle that it is unfair for the government to pay an enhanced price that its
demand has created); see also United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374-375 (1943) (ex-
plaining the difficulties of determining a fair market value for condemned property when
value in the market place is not readily ascertainable).
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ing are also scope of the project cases-that is, cases where a change
in market value is excluded because it is traced back to the govern-
ment's project-in those cases, war. In Cors the Court determined
that the requisitioning of a tug boat in wartime need not be compen-
sated at wartime prices. Those prices were themselves the result of
government policy: "It is not fair that the government be required to
pay the enhanced price which its demand alone has created."" In
Commodities Trading the market price increase was also traceable to
war. The government sought to measure just compensation for pep-
per not by the market price but by the price established through gov-
ernment price controls.)o Thus, while helpful for their statements on
equitable principles, Cors and Commodities Trading, and their proge-
ny,' do not speak directly to the enhancement of value not created
by the government, even though they derive the market value meas-
ure and the scope of the project rule from equity. On the other
hand, extending the scope of the project rule to war was itself a
noteworthy elaboration of the scope of the project rule-one that
broke new ground at the time by repudiating a more laissez-faire un-
derstanding that required the government to pay the price at the
time of taking.'"
Court discussion of the fundamentally equitable nature of the Just
Compensation Clause emerges in a variety of contexts, but a common
theme is that the fairness at issue emerges in a dyadic context. That
is, there are only two parties relevant to the Court's framing of equity.
The Flight 93 context is a more complex structure. It is not dyadic.
It is triadic, it has a third element: the "added" value of the attacks
and the family and public interest. In sum, while it is clear that just
compensation is concerned with equity, there are few precedents on
which to draw where courts assess what equity demands where the
change in value comes from the actions of third parties.
1. The Assassin's Property
Another national trauma, the assassination of President John F.
Kennedy, does provide a precedent where there was a triadic-not
dyadic-relationship. The government authorized the taking of the
189 Cors, 337 U.S. at 333.
190 Commodities Trading, 339 U. S. at 124.
191 See notes 184-88 and accompanying discussion.
192 Gregory R. Kirsch, Hurricanes and Windfalls: Takings and Price Controls in Emergencies, 79
VA. L. REv., 1235, 1245-46 (1993) (describing the doctrinal shift from World War I to
World War II as courts abandoned a strict market value approach).
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items which the Warren Commission had included in its report-this
included a number of personal effects taken from the assassin, Lee
Harvey Oswald, including personal letters, a diary, family photo-
graphs, a marriage license and the contents of Oswald's wallet. In a
proceeding to determine what compensation was due Oswald's widow
(after Oswald was himself assassinated), experts opined that the value
of the items had increased dramatically because of their indirect as-
sociation with the assassination. There was a collector's market, and
the items were valued at about seventeen thousand dollars, up from
three thousand. Thus, this case reproduces the central features we
wish to explore in the Flight 93 context: a measurable market en-
hancement in value; created by an event or third-party (the assassina-
tion, Oswald, and public curiosity); and an equitable concern.
In the conflicting opinions of the lower and appellate court we see
two approaches. The district court refused to award the market value
at the time of taking:
the elements of fair market value of the property involved here resulting
from association of the property with the assassination of the President
must be excluded from the measure of just compensation. The nation
and its people should not be required to pay a bounty for items of evi-
dence upon which the Warren Commission based its report.
The Fifth Circuit reversed-it did not find that it had the power to
take into account the equities of the case.194 The court distinguished
Cors and Commodities Trading as merely extensions of the scope of the
project rule. By contrast, here there was a market for Oswald's items
"quite apart" from the government's need for them. The Court con-
tinued that:
Were it not for the taking, the owner, Oswald's widow, would have been
able to realize a premium for Oswald's personal effects simply because of
their association with the killing of the president, this, regardless of
whether this court condones, as a matter of policy, the realization of any
premium attributable to such a crime. However, this peculiar interest in
the property having vested .. . the court's function upon condemnation
should be limited merely to assessing the value of the interest taken; in
this instance ... the taking deprived the owner of the collector's value
193 Porter v. United States, 335 F. Supp. 498, 500 (N.D. Tex. 1971). Five Tracts of Land v.
United States, 101 F. 661, 663 (3d Cir. 1900), a case concerning a taking at Gettysburg, al-
so has a triadic structure in that added value is described as potentially coming from the
historic and patriotic signficance of the site. The court rejects the notion that those parts
of value can be excluded from an assessment of market value or excluded from determin-
ing what compensation is due. Decided in 1900, it precedes the Supreme Court's subse-
quent cases concerning equity.
194 Porter v. United States, 473 F. 2d 1329, 1335, 1338 (5th Cir. 1973) (reversing the decision
of the district court).
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which otherwise she would have enjoyed and for which, therefore, she is
195
entitled to be compensated ....
In this exceptional case, the circuit court misreads the many general
statements from the Supreme Court about equity, incorrectly treating
equity as derivative of the scope of the project rule. The reverse rela-
tionship is the accurate understanding of Court precedent: the scope
of the project rule is an example of equity. The divide between the
district court and the appellate court, then, is not about how to assess
the equities, but whether this can be done at all.
Flight 93 is in some (but not all) respects a more compelling case
on equitable grounds. The property is not simply "associate [ed]"' 9 "
with the violence of 9/11, it directly partakes of it as the last resting
place of the passengers. On the other hand, Svonavec is itself an in-
nocent bystander (this is true for Oswald's widow too, but here we
might also consider the district court's concerns about the perverse
incentive that would be created if an assassin's relatives could enjoy
the enhancement hat their crime created).'" The public interest is
also seemingly distinct: the market value that the court awarded was
a "collector's" market that valued the Oswald papers as curiosities. In
the Flight 93 context, the market value is derivative of a broad public
interest in having a place for memorial and mourning. To put the
same point in terms of our central category, Oswald's property is not
described as "sacred" by the court or any of the parties. On the con-
trary-these objects are somewhat scandalous. Thus while the prece-
dent is helpful in that it is not dyadic or a scope of the project rule
case, we should not lose sight of the fact that it is not a case about
"sacred" property. In any case, the circuit court clearly inverts the re-
lationship established by the Supreme Court between equity and
market value.
The contrast between Flight 93 and Oswald's case is underscored
when we consider the treatment accorded another part of Oswald's
estate: the rifle used to assassinate the President.'" The district court
was simply unwilling to allow anyone to profit from the enhancement
in value when it came to the actual weapon used in the assassination.
Oswald's widow sold the rifle to John King, a collector, for $10,000.
195 Id. at 1335.
196 Id. at 1333.
197 See Porter, 335 F. Supp. at 500 (demonstrating the concern that the court had with incen-
tivizing future presidential assasinations through a windfall compensation to Oswald's
widow).
198 See King v. United States, 292 F. Supp. 767, 770 (D. Colo. 1968) (describing the rifle con-
demned by the government).
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King demanded compensation in the amount of $5,000,000, while
the government contended that he should be paid $51.40, Oswald's
purchase price.'" The district court avoided the issue of market value
altogether by finding that it was not possible to determine what that
value would be for such a unique object." In this instance, there is
no further appellate history and hence no further Fifth Circuit dis-
cussion, even though the district court's retreat into the impossibility
of making a determination of market value seems unconvincing. Ra-
ther, it suggests a doctrinally hidden intrusion of equitable con-
cerns.20 ' This is the outcome the government seems to desire in the
Flight 93 context: a deflection of the direct conflict between market
value and equity in favor of a finding that market value is simply too
speculative.
2. Illegal Windfalls And 'Golden Meteors'
Enhanced value also arises from an external event in the case of
natural disasters or windfalls, but whether an owner retains that value
does not seem to be litigated in takings proceedings. The "negative
implication," writes Gregory Kirsch in his article Hurricanes and Wind-
falls, is that in "hurricanes and other natural disasters, the established
takings compensation rules require compensation at the current
emergency market value; the windfall accrues to the owners."202 The
added value is assumed to accrue to the owner (or to be controlled
through some other mechanism, such as price controls and anti-
gouging statutes). In this Part, I suggest that the Flight 93 value is un-
like most "windfalls" in that it derives from violent and illegal con-
duct.
Legal scholar Eric Kades defines windfalls as "economic gains in-
dependent of work, planning, or other productive activities that soci-
ety wishes to reward."203 He notes the common understanding (which
he criticizes) that the beneficiary of a windfall is permitted to retain
it:
199 Id. at 774-775 (outlining the contentions of both King and the government).
200 See id. at 775 (holding that the rifle is too unique to derive a value from the market).
201 See Comment, just Compensation and the Assassin's Bequest: A Utilitarian Approach, 122 U. PA.
L. REv. 1012, 1018 n.27 (1974) (suggesting that the King court implicitly relied on subjec-
tive valutation rather than market price to determinejust compensation for the rifle).
202 Kirsch, , supra note 13, at 1254 ("Although there are later cases that contain constitu-
tional challenges to price control legislation or seek to characterize regulation as 'regula-
tory takings,' there appear to be no decisions subsequent o Cors and Commodities Trading
that bear directly on the interaction of price controls and just compensation in emergen-
cy markets.").
203 Eric Kades, Windfalls, 108 YALE L.J. 1489,1491 (1999) (emphasis removed).
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Perhaps surprisingly, Farmer Black receives as much legal protection for
manna fallen from heaven or, to use a less religious hypothetical, for a
golden meteor that falls onto Blackacre. Most commentators simply pre-
sume, in passing, that the law treats property obtained by luck no differ-
204ently than it treats property earned through effort.
Kades contests whether the common understanding is descriptively
or normatively correct (he finds contrary outcomes regarding wind-
falls in tax policy and a variety of other contexts), but he leaves the
descriptive claim unchallenged in the takings context.205  Assuming
compensation for the value of a windfall, is Svonavec like Farmer
Black, and Flight 93 a golden meteor?
It seems to be a windfall in Kades' sense - the plane crashed on
Svonavec's property and delivered Bell's intangible value and other
people's sacred value. It was a benefit independent of work or plan-
ning. But the differences are interesting as well. Unlike a windfall
that is an act of God or cosmological accident, the Flight 93 crash was
an act by an enemy against the United States, in the course of which
the gain in value is created. If we usually let the recipient retain the
windfall because we are indifferent to the allocation (since it comes
from god or the cosmos), it seems unlikely that we have the same in-
difference to the allocation of the value of Flight 93. The increase
was in some sense the obverse of the victims' loss-as the landowner's
counsel observed: "the final resting place of the heroes of United
Airlines Flight 93 is situated on the Subject Property."0 Indeed, we
204 Id. at 1491-92.
205 Id. at 1528 n.140. Kades seems somewhat skeptical as to whether takings law is so clear. In
a footnote supporting the characterization that compensation is awarded for windfalls in
the takings context, he writes that "[t] his assertion rests on the seemingly universal belief
that the law, including the Constitution, protects property obtained via windfalls just as
much as it protects property earned by effort or enterprise." My own research has not
found cases addressing whether or not a condemnee is compensated for the taking of a
value that comes as a windfall (defined as a benefit unrelated to planning or any other
personal trait and not coming from government action such as a zoning change). The
word windfall, in takings cases, typically refers to an incidental, unearned effect of gov-
ernment action (it would be a "windfall" to compensate the owner of land in the Florida
Everglades on the basis that the land could be developed, since that right was always un-
certain). Thus the term often seems to be used to refer to government "givings," not val-
ue from a third-party. On government "givings," see Abraham Bell & Gideon
Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 574 (2001) (contending that givings play at
least an equally important role in public life as government takings). Admittedly, it is
hard to believe that there is not authority on windfalls unrelated to government action. It
may be that leaving the benefit where it falls and thus including it in compensation is so
obvious that it does not appear in the case law-hence Kades' description of the belief in
compensation for windfalls as "seemingly universal."
206 Svonavec, Inc.'s Response in Opposition to United States' Rule 71.1(h) Motion and
Memorandum to Exclude the Valuation Testimony of Defendant's Appaiser Randall Bell
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might distinguish between two kinds of windfalls: "legal windfalls"
which increase wealth "by the legal and proper activities of others and
passed on to the individual in question by gift, inheritance or mere
chance, and 'illegal windfalls,' where the wealth was generated by the
proscribed activities of another and passed on to the individual."
The dumb luck of the owner is not easily separated from the illegal
conduct which creates the increase in value, and this undermines the
usual sense of the windfall as morally neutral. Paying for the en-
hanced value might best be seen as a kind of unjust enrichment.m In
sum, the enhancement in value seems distinct to the windfall in
which the public is not implicated, as with Kades' meteor.
Bell's notion of the intangible nature of the value captures anoth-
er important point: what fell was not a discrete commodity like a
golden meteor that is itself valuable. Rather, the value is tied to the
loss of life and property (which were incinerated in the crash and
thus largely unrecoverable). It is this absence that is a part of the val-
ue. Thus, that windfalls are included in takings awards may not be
relevant to the Flight 93 context. Perhaps surprisingly, reflecting on
the notion of the sacred helps clarify this intuition, as I suggest below.
3. The Sacred And just Compensation
The terminology of many of the participants in the Flight 93 dis-
pute is helpful in grappling with how to characterize what has taken
place from the point of view of takings and equity. By calling the
land "sacred," the parties seem to mean that in truth it no longer be-
longs to anyone-and yet that it must be taken by the government.
Rather than a value that fell from the heavens, the participants seem
to think of it as a value that arose from the scene of the disaster. This
is the deeper sense in which it is not a windfall-it was not that a pre-
existing value fell onto the land, it was in the destruction upon impact
and the public response thereto which created the contested sacred
and intangible value.
This characterization intersects with my argument about takings.
Just compensation seeks to make the condemnee whole, to return to
them what is taken from them. It is "the owner's loss, not the taker's
gain, which is the measure of compensation for the property taken,"
at 9, United States v. 275.81 Acres of Land, No. 3:09-cv-00233, 2014 BL 387242 (W.D. Pa.
June 10, 2014), Doc. 113.
207 Comment, just Compensation and the Assassins' Bequest: A Utilitarian Approach, 122 U. PA. L.
REV. 1012, 1024 (1974).
208 See generally Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment (2011).
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as the Supreme Court has observed.2 ' The term sacred should be
seen to articulate the intuition that the landowner never owned Bell's
intangible value.
When the land is taken from the owner, we might say, the sacred,
Bell's intangible value, the 9/11-related enhancement, is not. Clearly
we need not go as far as the government urged in the case of Os-
wald's rifle. There, the government sought o obtain title through
forfeiture, not condemnation. The Fifth Circuit described the gov-
ernment's theory as a "species of Deodands," that is, "[a] thing
which, because it had been the immediate cause of the death of a
person, was given to God, that is, forfeited to the crown to be applied
to pious uses."2 o Svonavec is to be compensated for the value of his
land, just not the increase due to the attack. And because he does
not own the enhancement, because it was not a windfall like a golden
meteor, equity does not require that compensation include its mone-
tary value. One possibility is to avoid the conflict between market
value and equity, as the district court did with the assassin's rifle. But
it may be necessary to confront the conflict, and in that case we
should openly discuss equity.21
B. The Publicly Motivated Private Market
Thus far, the discussion has focused on the issue of whether the
enhancement in market value that comes from an external event or a
third party may be excluded from determining just compensation. It
accepted the notion that the added value in the Flight 93 context
does not fall within the scope of the project rule which states that the
determination of value should not reflect changes in value stemming
212
from the government's plans with regards to the property. But
perhaps this concession misses an important dimension of the prob-
lem.
Remember that in the attacks, through killing citizens, an injury
was inflicted on the collectivity and the state. In the response to the
crash, over a million people have visited the crash site-and the con-
tinued public interest is the source of the property's intangible asset,
in Bells' terminology. Is it certain that this value is separate from the
government? Or that when we see such a collective response, that it
209 United States ex. rel. T.V.A. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 281 (1943).
210 King v. United States, 364 F. 2d 235, 235 n.1 (5th Cir. 1966).
211 As Justice Douglas noted, the "practical standard" of market value is used as a tool in the
ultimate pursuit of"substantial justice." Ors, 337 U.S. at 332.
212 See supra notes 159-72 and accompanying text.
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should not be treated-for takings purposes at least-as a value that
the public has created, and thus that their agent, the government,
should not have to pay for? While this may seem a loose conflation of
government and public, it mirrors the same loose conflation in the
logic of the terrorist attack on civilians-that in attacking the public
in general one is also attacking the state. It is not surprising, then,
that we might encounter the same confusion of public and govern-
ment action in our setting, as we attempt to determine whether the
enhancement in value is a government "project." In this vein, recall
that calling war a government project for takings purposes was itself a
doctrinal shift that marked the rise of total war in World War II and
the Court's shift from laissez-faire to New Deal understandings of the
relation between market and state. Calling the Flight 93 enhance-
ment a government project might then appear as simply updating
takings jurisprudence for the war on terror. War as a government
project reflected the economic realities of total war; the sites of terror
attacks as places of national mourning reflects the symbolic realities
of how terrorist attacks impact our society.
We encountered a version of the conflation between public and
private value in Colliers Pinkard's critique of LECG where it found
that the "highest and best use conclusion [of a profit-making memo-
rial] differs little from a public interest use for which a narrowly de-
fined buyer will pay a price premium, leading to a result in the LECG
appraisal that borders on public interest value."2 1 4 The market, in my
gloss, was composed of private individuals who were publicly motivated.
There is a "private" demand that drives up the price, but this can also
be seen as a public demand. This confounding of public and private
purposes suggests that the Flight 93 value could be characterized as
within the scope of the project rule. The problem is rather intricate.
There likely is a "private" demand that drives up the price, but should
it be excluded because it is specially and publicly motivated? It is
commonly said that a special or personal valuation-whether on the
government's or the landowner's side-is excluded. But what about
where the market is in the thrall of a "special" price? This is both a
contradiction in terms-what "the market" wants is per se "general"-
and yet it seems to be a good characterization of the situation. The
"market," we could say, is acting publicly, that is, like the government.
And the government is pursuing the "special" value of the public. As
213 See generally Kirsch, supra note 192, at 1270 (describing the doctrinal shift from World War
I to World War II as courts abandoned the strict market value approach).
214 Colliers Pinkard Review of LECG Appraisal, supra note 102, at 14.
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we saw, this was precisely the basis for the court-appointed Commis-
sion analysis-but it failed to address this issue.
C. Summary
In sum, we have seen that it is well established that the govern-
ment should not have to pay compensation for an increase in value
caused by the government, but that there is little support for extend-
ing this to exclude an increase in value created by other, non-
governmental action or events (natural disasters, windfalls, the asso-
ciation with the tragedy of Kennedy's assassination). I have attempt-
ed to distinguish those cases and contexts and have argued that the
vocabulary of the sacred and the intangible are helpful in formulat-
ing the proper legal understanding of the case. Critically, in those
contexts where value comes from third parties or external events, we
are morally indifferent to the allocation since the value comes from
outside the dyadic relationship between the government and the
landowner (as with a golden meteor). But that is not the case, it is
urged here, where the value comes from the public response to an
act of war. Just as the scope of the project rule was expanded to in-
clude the effects of total war in WWII, we might contemplate a similar
extension for acts of terror.
Cases such as Cors and Commodities Trading concerned the need for
items-tug boats and pepper-in times of war. The broad equitable
statements in those cases notwithstanding, it seems that would be ask-
ing a court to break new ground to explicitly apply an equitable anal-
ysis to a triadic context where value comes from a third party or
event, such as the Flight 93 context. But this is appropriate. The
central question is what compensation is just to the landowner and
just to the public. In applying such an analysis, various reasons have
been offered why we might withhold any 9/11-related enhancement.
Equally important as that outcome, however, is the engagement with
the question of what is equitable-which was not raised in the court
proceedings, beyond an understanding of equity as market value.
The government, landowner, and the court passed seamlessly from
just compensation to engage in their debate over market value-but
perhaps we would be well-served if they had articulated their broader
understanding of what it is that the public is being asked to pay for
and why that is appropriate.
IV. Reflections On The Sacred And Intangible Value
This Part steps back from the normative claims about how just
compensation should be understood in the Flight 93 case and seeks
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to gather together the multiple senses and meanings of the term sa-
cred. What, we still might ask, are people talking about? Is this of
any broader theoretical interest? Are scholarly treatments of the sa-
cred helpful in understanding our case study, and vice versa?
In the immediate public response to and perception of the at-
tacks, the term "sacred" captured an uncontained sort of energy and
power. The tens of thousands of people who came to the site, many
understanding that they were going to see sacred ground, highlight a
creative, unpredictable sense of the word. The sense that there was a
new, sacred value engendered a "popular eminent domain," to bor-
row from law and religion scholar Winnifred Sullivan, and "commit-
ted" the land, as the Commission said, to serve as a memorial regard-
less of what actions government undertook.1 6 Many of the now
routine definitions from sociological classics seem to dovetail with the
actors' usages: for example, both the French sociologist Emile Durk-
heim and the appraiser Jones understand the sacred as that which is
(in the words of the former) "set apart and forbidden."2 1' At other
times the lack of fit with academic treatments draws attention to an
important point. For instance, the ancient Roman idea of sacer as
property which belongs to the gods seems resonant,215 although in
our time it is the uncertainty around just who "owns" the sacred
which is at issue."9 Indeed, a good explanation for why such a simple
case took so long to resolve is because we don't seem to know who
owns the sacred.
Offshoots of the Durkheimian tradition, as law and religion schol-
ar Nathaniel Berman has documented, have focused on another as-
pect of the sacred: the "right" sacred ("associated with the consecra-
tion of 'social cohesion' and the 'preservation of rules and taboos"')
as opposed to the "left" sacred ("associated with 'dynamic ferment,'
with the 'explosive violation of life's rules,' with collective ecstasy") .220
This split, between conservative and transformational, between right
215 Sullivan, supra note 68, at 12.
216 See supra notes 161-72 and accompanying text.
217 EMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE 44 (Karen E. Fields trans.,
The Free Press 1995) (1912); see also HENRI HUBERT & MARCEL MAUSS, SACRIFICE: ITS
NATURE AND FUNCTION 97 (W.D. Halls trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1964) (1898); see
generally PAUL KAHN, SACRED VIOLENCE: TORTURE, TERROR, AND SOVEREIGNTY (2008).
218 ASAD, supra note 27, at 30.
219 Even the so-called "ambivalence of the sacred," the notion that it is both august and ac-
cursed, high and low, seems helpful as we are told that the land is priceless, and that it is
"vacant." GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE 75-80 (Dan-
iel Heller-Roazen trans. 1998).
220 Nathaniel Berman, The Sacred Conspiracy: Religion, Nationalism, and the Crisis of Internation-
alism, 25 LEIDENJ. INT'LL. 9, 17 (2012).
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and left, maps some of the usages we have encountered. In the pub-
lic surge towards the site, claiming the site for the public, and in the
individual attempt to access the sacred, and in the fear that this
would turn into a "circus," we see some of the potential of the "left"
sacred. In Murdoch and the Park Service's use, we see more of the
"right" sacred, an attempt to tame and harness the overflow of energy
and enthusiasm. But, interestingly, it does this through a turn to "na-
ture" - not explicit nationalism or state-worship. This muted version
of the "right" sacred left them open to attack, I suggested. They were
accused of desecration, of creating an Islamic site.
The relation to religion, and to Christianity, is also important to
note. For some, the sacred was explicitly Christian. For others, it was
a vague, spiritual, post-religious sensibility. Murdoch's subdued, pa-
cific, contemplative sacred seems quite distinct to the "epiphany" that
greeted an FBI employee when she arrived at the "sacred place" of
the crash site."'
All at once, the mist took full shape and I saw what appeared to be an-
gels. There were angels standing in the open area to the left of the crash
site. There were hundreds of them standing in columns .... This Arch-
angel stood with a stance of confidence and radiance. His aura por-
trayed that of leadership. He stood with saber in hand ... I knew instant-
ly this Archangel had to be Michael.m
This is not a benign post-secular spiritualism, but an energetic, char-
ismatic, and even militant, vision. Indeed, there are notable differ-
ences between the various actors ideas of the sacred: the popular,
wide-spread notions of the sacred which emerged soon after the at-
tack; Murdoch's sacred, contained within the structure of the Park
Service; the fears that Murdoch's plan was actually a form of Islamic
symbolism (which were taken quite seriously by the Flight 93 Com-
mission); and the intense vision of the FBI employee. In urging that
the government not pay for the sacred value, this range seems im-
portant to take into account. I have been drawn towards denying
compensation to the landowner based on the claim that the en-
hanced value is public value, and thus that the public should not pay
for what it itself created-an elaboration, we might say, of the scope
of the project rule. But this is a rather benign, Durkheimian sense of
the sacred as the social, and the social as the sacred. Durkheim theo-
rized that all societies were organized around such sacred values, val-
ues which transcended the everyday divisions of politics (be they reli-
221 LEONARDI, supra note 30, at 37-38.
222 Id. at 37-38.
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gious values, or the sacred rights of property) .223 The story of the
Archangel Michael gives some pause about such a secularizing read-
ing of the sacred as just a benign social glue and cohesive force. If we
understand the sacred in this more sectarian way, perhaps it is not so
widely shared, and not best seen as a public value for which the gov-
ernment should not have to offer compensation.
The role of heritage in managing the sacred is also central to the
story of the Flight 93 site. Despite the pervasive talk of the sacred, we
saw that there was no legal or policy category of "the sacred" (except
for Native American sites). To remove the land from the market and
preserve the new value present on the site, Congress turned to the
categories more readily available: heritage, memorial, National Park.
While heritage may dovetail with Murdoch's sacred, there is a palpa-
ble gap between heritage and some of the other conceptions. The
FBI agent's vision is not a historical, contemplative, or nature-
remediation-based sacred. It seems far more vital and demanding.
In the deployment of heritage at the Flight 93 site, we see a way that
the government and other parties have largely contained, sustained,
and institutionalized various, but not all, senses of the sacred and in-
tangible value.
CONCLUSION
It is a common refrain that value is increasingly assessed in mone-
tary terms. Public services are privatized. Other vocabularies of
worth seem to increasingly slip away, replaced by conceptions of value
simply as price, and goods simply as commodities.224 Some of the re-
sponses to the attacks of 9/11 point in a different direction altogeth-
er. Rather than seeing a social order grounded in markets and price,
many Americans saw something quite different: a society where acts
of heroism and sacrifice were important, perhaps even a society
where markets were dependent on the state and ordinary citizens for
their support and not simply autonomous systems of exchange. On a
more local scale, these sentiments were expressed by those who saw
that what had been ordinary private property and rolling hills in rural
Pennsylvania was now something quite different. The land was
decommodified, taken out of its everyday status as an exchangeable
resource, and reallocated-"committed" in the words of the Commis-
sion-as a place of national mourning. Rather than treating this as a
223 DURKHEIM, supra note 217, at 418-19.
224 See SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN'T Buy, supra note 10, at 6.
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simple or obvious outcome, we should approach such a transfor-
mation carefully and trace in detail how different constituencies-
family members of those killed, real estate appraisers, lawyers, the
courts-understood and struggled over that change. More pointedly,
rather than thinking we know ex ante what is meant by public and pri-
vate, commodity and its opposite, the approach adopted here insists
on seeing these categories as social categories that are reproduced
225and creatively adapted to novel situations. That is, we should ap-
proach these categories much like the anthropologist approaches the
fundamental categories of any society. What have we discovered?
First, there was broad societal agreement hat some fundamental
change had taken place in the status of the land. It was socially obvi-
ous to a broad section of the public, as underscored by the act of
Congress authorizing and recognizing the memorial and by the mil-
lion or so people who visited the site. This feature distinguishes this
case from a variety of others-for instance cases where members of a
religious group see a miracle at an everyday location and seek to turn
it into a shrine, but whose perception is not shared by a majority of
their fellow citizens nor the government. What was shared in the
Fight 93 case was a notion that they were not engaging with a normal
commercial space, and that norms of gift giving and the laying of
tributes was proper, not the norms of markets and exchange. Thus
even the landowner stated that he always intended to donate the "sa-
cred ground" as a memorial.2
Second, alongside the broad agreement that the land was no
longer a simple commodity, we have documented the multiplicity of
competing understandings and vocabularies seeking to grasp precise-
ly what had happened. Where market value may be clear and simple,
this non-market value was various and hard to pin down. Some called
the land sacred, and this itself meant a variety of things (some tied to
recognizable established religions, others more loosely expressive of a
nondenominational civil religion, others were vaguely spiritual). Bell
described a new intangible value embedded in the land deriving from
the important events that had taken place there. Hundreds of thou-
sands of people left a range of trinkets and memorial items-
227Christian crosses, baseball caps, letters. In sum, there was unanimi-
ty that the land was no longer a simple commodity. At the same time,
this left a lot of room for disagreement, as well as for fears that the
225 See generally PAUL W. KAHN, PUTrING LIBERALISM IN ITS PLACE (2005); JOHN R. SEARLE,
THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY (1995).
226 See supra note 128 and accompanying text
227 See supra notes 35, 46, and accompanying text.
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market might improperly reappear (in the form of the circus and the
selling of trinkets) .
Third, in addition to the variety of meanings, there was no legal or
policy category that fit the demands of the moment. This is perhaps
what we should expect from a government that (by some understand-
ings at least) is not concerned with matters of transcendent spiritual
or religious meaning. Unlike the Catholic who witnesses a miracle
in an everyday setting, and can seek to have that miracle recognized
through a formal and explicit Church process," the government did
not have a category of "sacred" land ready to deploy.
Fourth, although there was no legal category that perfectly fit the
situation, there was a clear effort on the part of government and
some constituents to bring some order and stability to what the site
meant and how it was to be used. Even though the attacks were un-
bearably recent, the site was declared "heritage" and bureaucratically
put in the category of parks and memorials.231' Here we also saw the
architectural profession's effort to name and stabilize just what this
process of decommodification would mean. The architect Murdoch
called the site sacred, but did not link this to any specific religion
(doing so would have raised establishment clause concerns, not to
mention complaints by members of other religions) .'2 His initial
plans generated a spirited attack that the interpretive openness of his
plan was really a cover for Islam. The turn to an idea of nature and
the site as a place of natural healing deflected those attacks.3  In
sum, so far as a matter of law and policy, it was heritage and memori-
als that apparently best fit the situation. In the process of
decommodification, a notion of the sacred untethered to religion or
nationalism was seemingly too hot to handle, and better replaced by
"nature."
Fifth, as a matter of property law, the transition between the two
domains, the market to the non-market, was not as simple as merely
declaring that the transition had taken place. Indeed, even though
the attacks may have "committed" the land to the zone of
decommodification, in the term used by the Commission, as a politi-
cal and social matter, this was not sufficient as a matter of law. This is
228 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
229 See generally, PAUL W. KAHN, PUTTING LIBERALISM IN ITS PLACE (2005).
230 See RUTH HARRIS, LOURDES: BODY AND SPIRIT IN THE SECULAR AGE 3-4 (1999); KENNETH L.
wOODWARD, MAKING SAINTS: How THE CATHOLIC CHURCH DETERMINES WHO BECOMES A
SAINT, WHO DOESN'T AND WHY 84-85 (1990).
231 See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
232 See, e.g., Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700 (2010).
233 See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
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an important point to underscore, since it speaks to the importance
of law, and property rights in particular, within our cultural order. By
contrast, imagine a theocracy where, when "sacred" value appears, it
trumps other claims. We might say that the non-market value simply
overwhelms the market value. Or in a society where regardless of the
other values claimed, there is no way to overcome a claim of private
property (other than through consensual sale, that is, where there is
no power of eminent domain), we might then say that there is no
value higher than private property, that private property, in the words
of classical economist and moral philosopher Adam Smith, is itself
"sacred."23 4 But at the heart of the story we have examined, we see
neither of these extremes in the relation between market value and
non-market value. The land can be decommodified for a public use
and turned into a memorial (through the power of eminent domain
if need be). But the claims of private property are not discarded as
worthless; rather the owner is to receive just compensation. This is
obvious, but it helps frame what we have explored in this Article: the
precise and exacting efforts undertaken by our legal system in effect-
ing, as a matter of property law, the transition between market and
non-market value. We have seen, as it were, the birth pangs of
decommodification up close.
Sixth, we confronted the question of how the interface between
market and non-market value actually unfolded. On the one hand, it
took place in the domain of market value. Again, this states the obvi-
ous, but I do so in order to raise the specter of the alternative: imag-
ine that upon the apparition of some sacred value in another society,
the owner could be paid in the currency of that religious system (so
many miracles or blessings, let us say). Obviously, value, in our case, is
measured in market value. What we documented was the effort to
determine the market value of the crash site. At the same time, we
noted that market value and non-market values were not kept clearly
distinct. It was simply taken as a given, without recourse to an as-
sessment of market value, that the crash site land would be set apart
as a memorial, as "sacred ground." In other words, the non-market
value, the decommodification, provided the context for the discus-
sion of market value.
Finally, the Article took issue with the understanding that the
landowner should be awarded the market value of the land including
the enhancement of value due to the 9/11 attacks. The value of the
234 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS I:10
(1776).
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9/11 attacks apparently can be given a market measure. But here, it
was argued, the parties lost sight of the explicitly equitable task of giv-
ing 'just compensation." That is, the Constitution speaks to how to
the interface between market and non-market values is to be done. It
does not say follow market value, but just compensation-that is, to
engage in an equitable analysis, however unwieldy that may be. Re-
gardless of how one thinks the equitable arguments may be resolved,
the first goal of the Article has simply been to urge that such argu-
ments should be made, which did not happen in this court proceed-
ing.
The Article explored a number of factors and arguments as to why
it might be appropriate to exclude the "sacred" value from the
amount due the landowner. Most simply, the government's appraiser
Jones seems to get the matter right when he mentions, almost in pass-
ing, that the "sacred ground" will forever remain as a memorial, and
then proceeds to appraise the land as though nothing had happened
there. The government attorneys attacked Bell's claims for their im-
precision. Had they focused on the broader equitable question of
what constitutes just compensation, however, they might have been
able to contest Bell's premise. Bell, it seems to me, is right that there
is an "intangible" attached to the property-but the landowner is not
entitled to it. That value was, we should say, embedded in the land,
but the landowner never truly had title to it. And yet we should also
note the outcome of the case: the landowner did not receive the al-
most forty-fold increase in value asked for. Rather the Commission
and court, showing some skepticism about just how valuable the sa-
cred and the intangible in fact were, awarded far less, somewhat less
than three times the land's value excluding the 9/11 attacks. Even
though the doctrine may not have been correctly understood, there
was practical wisdom in the result. The broad claim that ours is an
era where we can only think in terms of market value seems con-
firmed by the participants in the legal process, even while the entire
exercise concerns taking the land out of the market.
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